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THE REGULATOR EFFECT IN
FINANCIAL REGULATION
Jonathan R. Macey†
This Article examines situations in which government regulation makes
mandatory the use of certain devices and institutions that have been gener-
ated by markets and private ordering in the financial sector.  I refer to the
process of taking devices and institutions created by market processes and
making their use mandatory “regulation by assimilation” because the process
involves the adoption and incorporation by the government of devices and
institutions developed by participants in the financial markets for different
(though often somewhat related) purposes.  Devices and institutions that
have been developed internally by market participants and then assimilated
into regulation include the credit ratings generated by credit rating agencies
(which were designated by regulators as Nationally Recognized Statistical
Rating Organizations or NRSROs), the Value at Risk (VaR) models that
measure the risk of financial institutions’ portfolios, the advisory and fair-
ness opinions issued by investment banks in the context of significant corpo-
rate transactions, and the audits of corporations’ financial results by
independent outside auditors.
This Article makes two contributions to our understanding of the regu-
lation of financial market participants.  First, I show that the phenomenon
of regulation by assimilation is common, if not ubiquitous, in the financial
world.  Second, I show that the process of regulation by assimilation has
negative consequences that have not previously been anticipated or even
identified.  These negative consequences manifest themselves by ossifying, as
well as weakening, and even corrupting the efficacy of the private sector insti-
tutions and techniques that have been assimilated.  The analysis in this Arti-
cle indicates that the previously unidentified phenomenon of regulation by
assimilation was a major cause of the financial crisis of 2007 and 2008
because it distorted the ability of firms and markets to measure and assess the
riskiness of their activities.
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INTRODUCTION
In finance, regulators and market participants ostensibly have
overlapping, if not identical, goals.  These goals are to measure risk
accurately and in a timely fashion, to improve the reliability of corpo-
rate disclosure in order to enable firms to make credible commit-
ments to investors, and to cause scarce resources (capital) to flow to
those market participants who can make the best use of it.  Firms in
search of investors and customers want to distinguish themselves from
their rivals.  Regulators want to enable investors and customers to
make better decisions about how to allocate their resources.1
Sometimes regulators and market participants use different tech-
niques in order to accomplish their common goals.  Regulators
threaten to punish fraud with jail time.  Market participants use secur-
ities design, incentive-based compensation, and other contractual de-
vices to signal that they are telling the truth.  Increasingly however,
perhaps frustrated by their lack of success in detecting fraud and in
identifying bubbles in the financial sector, regulators have abandoned
traditional regulatory techniques in favor of promulgating rules that
take the devices, mechanisms, and institutions being used in the pri-
vate sector and assimilate them into regulations.2
Regulators’ incorporation of market devices into regulation ex-
emplifies what I term “regulation by assimilation.”  The most striking
example of this phenomenon in finance is the adoption by regulators
of the banks’ internal, often proprietary, risk assessment Value at Risk
(VaR) algorithms.  Regulators in turn use the VaR algorithms to evalu-
ate the financial conditions and capital needs of those same banks.
Prior to the financial crisis, bank regulators noticed that financial in-
1 See, e.g., The Investor’s Advocate:  How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integ-
rity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://
www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Jan. 20, 2013) (“The mission of the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission is to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and
efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation.”).
2 See infra Part II; see also TIMOTHY J. SINCLAIR, THE NEW MASTERS OF CAPITAL 10
(2005) (“Increasingly, ratings are key elements in transnational financial regulation.”).
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stitutions were using quantitative risk measurement techniques in or-
der to determine the riskiness of their own activities.  These models
attempted to evaluate not only loan performance but also loan quality
and managerial processes such as internal risk controls.  Recognizing
“the extent to which bank risk management and supervisory capital
requirements share common objectives,”3 regulators assimilated
banks’ own internal risk models into regulation.  As a Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) official observed:
Of all the changes in capital regulation being considered by the Ba-
sel Committee on Banking Supervision, the most fundamental shift
from current practice is that the risk-based capital requirements for
the largest banks would no longer be based on a few preset ratios
dictated by the regulators.  Instead, these banks would play a major
role in setting their own capital requirements by using their internal
estimates of the underlying risk of each credit exposure as inputs
into regulator-defined formulas called risk-weight functions.  Collec-
tively, this approach is known as the internal ratings-based (IRB)
approach.4
This sort of “regulation by assimilation” is not limited to banks’
internal risk assessments.  The technique of regulation by assimilation
has become very widespread, indeed ubiquitous, among regulators in
the financial sector.  The examples of regulation by assimilation ex-
amined in this Article are: the co-option of the ratings generated by
credit rating agencies, the fairness opinions produced by investment
banks and other financial firms, the outside audits performed by inde-
pendent accounting firms, and finally, and probably most impor-
tantly, the internal risk assessments (VaR models) generated by banks
and investment banks to measure the riskiness of the assets held on
and off of their balance sheets.  Each of these examples of co-option is
more or less well known—if not to the public, at least to market par-
ticipants.  Indeed, by definition, such co-option is perfectly transpar-
ent.  Moreover, co-option often is strongly encouraged by regulated
firms for a variety of reasons discussed here.
As a descriptive matter, this Article examines the removal of these
devices from the purely private sphere and their assimilation into the
broader regulatory framework.  The descriptive analysis further gener-
ates the conclusion that the co-option of voluntary market mecha-
3 William L. Rutledge, Exec. Vice President of the Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Speech
Before the British Bankers Associations at the Basel 2/CAD 3 Half-Day Conference: Imple-
menting the New Basel Accord (Mar. 13, 2003), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/
newsevents/speeches/2003/rut031303.html.
4 George French et al., Risk-Based Capital Requirements for Commercial Lending: The Im-
pact of Basel II, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP. (Apr. 21, 2003), http://www.fdic.gov/bank/
analytical/fyi/2003/042103fyi.html.
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nisms inevitably corrupts these mechanisms and is likely to have
contributed significantly to the recent financial crisis.
It is worth noting that the analysis offered here is analytically re-
lated to a previous generation of scholarship about the distinction be-
tween and the relative merits of mandatory rules imposed by law and
enabling rules into which firms can opt at their discretion.  In the
recent past, much progress has been made towards a fuller under-
standing of the vital distinction between such mandatory rules and
enabling rules in corporate law and contracts.5
Largely ignored, however, is the analogous phenomenon of regu-
latory co-option.  Just as lawmakers may transform enabling rules that
parties can contract around into mandatory rules that are immutable,
so too do regulators sometimes compel the use of certain market de-
vices and mechanisms that historically have been used by market par-
ticipants, on a voluntary basis if at all.  This is regulation by
assimilation.
All market mechanisms begin as enabling mechanisms that
emerge to solve some problem or other that is plaguing market par-
ticipants.6  But often market mechanisms are clumsily co-opted by reg-
ulators who attempt to make certain regulations more efficient by
incorporating the use of market mechanisms into the regulatory pro-
cess.  For example, credit ratings on government debt and corporate
debt issued by credit rating agencies began as purely private (ena-
bling) institutions.  Nobody was required to use credit ratings.  Later,
however, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), followed
over time by a dazzling array of other regulators, including state insur-
ance regulators and state and federal banking regulators, decided to
make credit ratings mandatory for some companies under some cir-
cumstances.  Thus, this enabling market institution gradually became
mandatory for issuers.7
5 See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic The-
ory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 87 (1989) (“The legal rules of contracts and corpora-
tions can be divided into two distinct classes.  The larger class consists of ‘default’ rules that
parties can contract around by prior agreement, while the smaller, but important, class
consists of ‘immutable’ rules that parties cannot change by contractual agreement.  Default
rules fill the gaps in incomplete contracts; they govern unless the parties contract around
them.  Immutable rules cannot be contracted around; they govern even if the parties at-
tempt to contract around them.”).
6 All rules begin as enabling rules in the sense that, in the absence of mandatory
rules or other regulatory constraints, firms can adopt more or less any system of private
ordering that they choose.  Later, regulators codify these arrangements, choosing for vari-
ous reasons to make some rules mandatory for firms and individuals and leaving others as
enabling.
7 See Arthur R. Pinto, Control and Responsibility of Credit Rating Agencies in the United
States, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 341, 347 & nn.37–39 (2006) (discussing the process by which
credit ratings became mandatory).
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In addition to the descriptive project of detailing the process by
which spontaneously generated market mechanisms are co-opted by
government regulators, this Article makes a normative contribution in
which it describes the corrupting influence of government co-option
of naturally occurring market mechanisms.  Analysis of the incidences
of co-option reveals that market mechanisms do not remain the same
after they are incorporated into regulation.  Most significantly, the
original, demand-driven motivation for utilizing a particular market
mechanism disappears when the market mechanism is incorporated
into a rule.  In place of market demand, use of the market mechanism
by private sector actors becomes driven by regulation.  When this hap-
pens, the process of implementing the market mechanism is corrupted.
Continuing with our example above—the government co-option
of private sector credit rating agencies—companies issuing securities
originally procured credit ratings because the cost of the rating was
less than the benefits that the rating provided to the issuer, which
came in the form of a lower cost of capital on debt issues that had
been vetted by independent, highly regarded rating agencies.8  In this
unregulated environment, credit rating agencies had strong incen-
tives to maintain their reputations for providing high quality ratings
because, if the ratings they issued were not credible, investors would
not pay more for highly rated securities than for other securities, and
issuers would have no incentive to incur the cost of procuring a credit
rating when issuing debt.  This market dynamic was corrupted once
investors were required by regulators to purchase securities rated by the
established credit rating agencies.9  The largest credit rating agencies
were transformed into “Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Orga-
nizations” (NRSROs).10  Upon achieving this official, quasi-govern-
mental status, these rating agencies no longer had to compete on the
basis of the quality of their ratings.  They sought to maximize profits
by keeping the cost of producing ratings low.11  Credit rating agencies
had no incentive to improve  the quality of the ratings.12  But rating
quality no longer mattered as issuers had to pay for ratings because
regulations either mandated or created overwhelming incentives to
obtain ratings from a governmentally sanctioned NRSRO.13
8 See id. at 341–42.
9 See Frank Partnoy, How and Why Credit Ratings Agencies Are Not Like Other Gatekeepers,
in FINANCIAL GATEKEEPERS: CAN THEY PROTECT INVESTORS? 59, 63–64 (Yasuyuki Fuchita &
Robert E. Litan eds., 2006).
10 See id. at 64.
11 See id. at 65–66.
12 See id. at 68 (noting how the credit rating agencies’ surge in profitability is “notwith-
standing [their] abysmal recent performance”).
13 See FRANK PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED: HOW DECEIT AND RISK CORRUPTED THE FI-
NANCIAL MARKETS 406–07 (2009) (arguing that regulation leads to a distortion of incentives
for gatekeepers and using credit rating agencies as an example); Francis A. Bottini, An
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The notion that credit rating agencies do not generate informa-
tion of value is fairly well known.14  What is not well understood is the
fact that this was not always the case.  Credit ratings used to be of high
quality.15  Absent regulation, credit rating agencies had to generate
very high quality information about issuers in order to survive.16  This
quality was corrupted when ratings were co-opted into regulation.
Most importantly, the corruption of credit rating agencies through
regulation by assimilation is by no means unique.  A number of impor-
tant market mechanisms have been corrupted by regulation.  In fact,
it appears that whenever regulators attempt to co-opt a market mecha-
nism, the market mechanism tends to become corrupted, even when
the regulators are acting with the best of intentions.
The transformation of market institutions to mandatory institu-
tions has been curiously understudied, particularly since one observes
it quite often.  In addition to credit ratings, audits once were volun-
tary but now are mandatory for public companies.17  And corpora-
Examination of the Current Status of Rating Agencies and Proposals for Limited Oversight of Such
Agencies, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 579, 603–08 (1993) (discussing SEC regulations that rely on
oft-criticized credit ratings to exempt securities issuers and institutional buyers from disclo-
sure requirements).  The author notes how NRSROs in the 1970s and 1980s failed to
downgrade credit ratings fast enough in a number of high profile instances, including the
bond ratings of both New York City and the Washington Public Power Supply System.
Bottini, supra, at 584–88.  Furthermore, NRSROs were accused of attempting to influence
and being influenced by politicians. Id. at 595–98.  Allegations exist that the small number
of NRSROs results in a lack of competition, leading to inadequate “disclosure of important
financial information to investors who rely on the ratings.” Id. at 600. Cf. Jonathan R.
Macey & Hillary A. Sale, Observations on the Role of Commodification, Independence, and Govern-
ance in the Accounting Industry, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1167, 1175–77 (2003) (providing an expla-
nation of a similar process in the accounting industry); Pinto, supra note 7, at 351–55 R
(noting the difficulty of bringing litigation against NRSROs). See generally SINCLAIR, supra
note 2 (providing an overview of the history of the credit rating industry). R
14 See PARTNOY, supra note 13, 385–87; see also id. at 350 (noting that, in the period of R
corporate failings following Enron’s collapse, “[t]he last ones to react, in every case, were
the credit-rating agencies, which downgraded companies only after all the bad news was in,
frequently just days before a bankruptcy filing”); Efraim Benmelech & Jennifer Dlugosz,
The Credit Rating Crisis, 24 NBER MACROECONOMICS ANN. 161, 161 (2010) (quoting econo-
mist Alan Blinder, who wrote in a 2007 New York Times article that “[i]nvestors placed too
much faith in the rating agencies which, to put it mildly, failed to get it right”); Benmelech
& Dlugosz, supra, at 202 (concluding that while less than ten percent of tranches were
downgraded in 2007 to 2008, “the frequency and magnitude of downgrades reached re-
cord levels”).
15 See SINCLAIR, supra note 2, at 23–24. R
16 See Partnoy, supra note 9, at 63 & n.18 (noting that due to the credit agencies’ R
failure to anticipate the market crash of 1929, “the credit rating industry went into a gen-
eral decline,” and “credit rating agencies were not especially profitable”).
17 Under the Securities Act of 1933, companies that sell registered securities must
supply a current balance sheet and income statements from the previous three years, all
certified by an independent auditor. 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (2006) (setting out Schedule A,
which includes the financial statement requirement in paragraphs 25–26).  The Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 requires that annual reports of companies be certified by “indepen-
dent public accountants.”  15 U.S.C. § 78m(a)(2).  Independent auditors are subject to
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tions’ internal risk assessments are being internalized into regula-
tions.18
Likewise, various sorts of advisory services, particularly the ren-
dering of fairness opinions, which are professional opinions rendered
by investment banks about whether the terms of major corporate
transactions (e.g., mergers, corporate acquisitions, share repurchases,
and leveraged buyouts) are fair, began their existence as voluntary
mechanisms.  They now are essentially mandatory in a wide variety of
contexts.19  Investment banks deliver fairness opinions typically for
hefty fees, and in connection with their provision of financial advice,
to corporations deciding whether to pursue important deals.20
This Article proceeds as follows.  Part I contains an analysis of the
economic rationales for the use of the market mechanisms described
in this Article.  This section consists of a discussion of the specific mar-
ket imperfections that private sector institutions are attempting to
solve through various innovations.  Not surprisingly, these market im-
perfections manifest themselves in the form of the transaction costs
that confront companies when they try to raise capital from outsiders
and the agency cost problems that confront shareholders and credi-
tors who are trying to monitor the firms in which they have invested.
Part II contains an analysis of four critical voluntary market insti-
tutions that have been incorporated (co-opted) by regulators in vari-
ous ways.  These institutions consist of: (a) the credit ratings
generated by credit rating agencies; (b) the fairness opinions gener-
ated by investment banks; (c) the outside audits provided by indepen-
dent auditing firms; and (d) the internal risk assessments (generally
VaR models) that financial institutions use to determine whether they
have sufficient levels of capital to operate safely.
I
MARKET MECHANISMS AND THEIR CO-OPTION
AND CORRUPTION
In the realm of corporate governance and finance, the market
mechanisms examined in this Article initially were designed for the
“[s]trict liability and negligence-like causes of action.” See Macey & Sale, supra note 13, at R
1173.
18 For example, in 1997, the SEC mandated that companies provide more informa-
tion regarding the market risk of their derivatives.  17 C.F.R. § 229.305 (1999); Disclosure
of Accounting Policies for Derivative Financial Instruments, Release Nos. 33-7386; 34-
38223; IC-22487; FR-48, pg. 26–28 (Jan. 31, 1997).  The rule offered companies three op-
tions, “the easiest of which was to disclose a VAR measure with a 95 percent confidence
interval.” PARTNOY, supra note 13, at 262.  The Federal Reserve and the Bank for Interna- R
tional Settlements also favored using VaR models. Id.
19 See Steven M. Davidoff, Fairness Opinions, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1557, 1558–60 (2006).
20 See Marie Leone, Fairness Opinion Neutrality Questioned, CFO (Feb. 2, 2006), http://
www.cfo.com/article.cfm/5465857.
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purpose of mitigating various contracting and agency problems facing
entrepreneurs, managers, and investors.  Fairness opinions from in-
vestment banks and credit ratings from credit rating agencies were
meant to ameliorate the contracting problem21 that results from the
fact that contracting parties possess radically asymmetric information
about the assets over which they are contracting.22
The audits performed by independent accounting firms similarly
reduce contracting costs by allowing firms to make credible promises
that the financial information they are providing to investors and
others is accurate.23  In addition, outside, independent audits reduce
agency costs by alerting directors and other corporate monitors about
financial and accounting anomalies and irregularities that constitute
red flags and require investigation.
Similarly, accurate internal risk assessments can serve the addi-
tional purpose of controlling agency costs within firms.  More accu-
rate assessments of risk not only help firms control their risks and
establish minimum capital levels but also enable companies to provide
more accurate incentive-based compensation and other rewards.24
This, in turn, reduces the moral hazard that faces managers who are
compensated on the basis of their performance, because adjusting the
realized outcomes of particular investments for their risk has the ef-
fect of decreasing the returns of projects deemed to be relatively risky
and concomitantly increasing the returns of relatively safe projects.25
The consequences of subverting these market mechanisms de-
scribed here can hardly be overstated.  These market mechanisms
served the function, in other words, of mitigating information asym-
21 See Davidoff, supra note 19, at 1563–69 (detailing the “scope, purpose, and form” of R
fairness opinions); Pinto, supra note 7, at 341–42 (noting the significance of credit rating R
agencies).
22 See Douglas O. Edwards, An Unfortunate “Tail”: Reconsidering Risk Management Incen-
tives After the Financial Crisis of 2007–2009, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 247, 283–85 (2010) (discuss-
ing information asymmetry).
23 See PARTNOY, supra note 13, at 153 (noting that the use of Generally Accepted Ac- R
counting Principles (GAAP), as certified by independent accounting firms, “[was] a key
factor in persuading investors that stock prices of companies . . . were fair and accurate”);
Michael Minnis, The Value of Financial Statement Verification in Debt Financing: Evidence from
Private U.S. Firms, 49 J. ACCT. RES. 457, 458–59 (2010) (“The role of an audit is to assure
financial statement users that the statements are compiled and presented according to
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles . . . .”).
24 See PARTNOY, supra note 13, at 40–41.  The author describes the RAROC (Risk-Ad- R
justed Return on Capital) model as adopted by Bankers Trust in the late 1980s and early
1990s to determine compensation for employees “not only on how much money they
made, but also on how risky their business was.” Id.
25 Id. at 41; see Carl L. Hyndman, Regulatory Update, Internal Models for Measuring
Credit Risk: Their Impact on Capital Needs, 12 COM. LENDING REV. 58, 58–60 (1997) (describ-
ing the process by which banks employed the RAROC model to evaluate the riskiness of
loans). See generally Bengt Ho¨lmstrom, Moral Hazard and Observability, 10 BELL J. ECON. 74
(1979) (explaining how any disclosure may tend to ameliorate moral hazard).
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metry problems, signaling problems, and credibility problems that if
left uncorrected will, as George Akerlof famously explained, cause
markets to implode.26
A. Asymmetry of Information and the Inability to Make Credible
Commitments
The analysis begins with the assumption that both private sector
actors and public officials are acutely interested in facilitating capital
formation.  Of course, the private sector actors are concerned about
raising money for their particular firms while public sector officials
are presumably less concerned about the fate of particular firms than
they are about the general economic environment in which capital
formation takes place.
One way that this commonality of interests among private and
public actors manifests itself is that both groups have incentives to
fashion remedies for the contracting problems that plague companies
in search of capital and their potential investors.27  For example, when
a company requires working capital or needs funding for a particular
project, it will seek access to the public and private markets for debt or
equity.  The ability of companies to attract such capital will depend on
their ability to convince investors that they will refrain from abscond-
ing with their investment dollars and will instead be able to offer a
competitive rate of return on any funds entrusted to the company.
There are several ways that regulation and market forces attempt
to overcome the credible commitment problem that makes it difficult
for unknown market participants to attract capital.  Among the most
important potentially available strategies that may be deployed either
separately or together are: (a) investing in reputation;28 (b) submit-
ting to an intensive regulatory regime in which fraud is pursued and
punished assiduously;29 and  (c) submitting to a trading environment
characterized by high degrees of transparency and efficiency so that
fraud and misrepresentations quickly will be ferreted out by rivalrous
26 See George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488, 490 (1970).
27 See Jonathan Macey, The Value of Reputation in Corporate Finance and Investment Bank-
ing (and the Related Roles of Regulation and Market Efficiency), 22 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 18, 23
(2010); Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the Interna-
tional Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903, 941–42 (1998).
28 Hiring one or more reputational intermediaries can serve as a substitute for a di-
rect investment in reputation.  Companies without reputations must either use reputa-
tional intermediaries or confine themselves to the loan market, where commercial banks
and other lenders perform intensive (and costly) ongoing monitoring and use various pro-
tective covenants and other restrictions on borrowers to protect themselves against oppor-
tunistic behavior. See generally Macey, supra note 27. R
29 See Choi & Guzman, supra note 27, at 940–41 (“Through public regulation, . . . R
issuers are better able to commit credibly to remaining truthful in their securities disclo-
sures.” (footnote omitted)).
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competition among market professionals such as arbitrageurs and
stock market professionals.30
In his seminal 1970 article titled The Market for Lemons: Quality
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism,31 Professor Akerlof provided the
theoretical foundation for the economic role of the strategies de-
scribed above.  The fundamental cause of the problem in search of
solutions is “information asymmetry,” the situation that arises when
one party to a transaction (usually the seller, though not always) has
more and better information about the product or service than its
counterparty.  In cases where information asymmetries are large
enough, markets will fail to the point of implosion unless something is
done to restore the informational balance.32
Akerlof explained the conditions under which information asym-
metries lead to market collapse with an illustration from the market
for used cars.  In American vernacular, the cars of the poorest quality
in this market are dubbed “lemons” while cars of the highest quality
are “cherries.”  In Akerlof’s model, all other cars—those whose quality
is somewhere between these two extremes—are lumped together as
“average.”  In an ideal world of “perfect” (or costlessly available) infor-
mation, all cherries will sell for the highest prices, all lemons for the
lowest prices, and all average cars for prices in between.  But now let’s
consider what happens when we move from a world of “perfect mar-
kets” to one characterized by significant, even chronic, asymmetry of
information—a world in which sellers and buyers often do not know
one another, do not engage in repeat dealings, and, to make things
worse, do not have reliable, well-informed reputational intermediaries
to provide them with the information they lack.  In this radically “im-
perfect,” informationally challenged world, sellers of both lemons and
average cars may be tempted to pass their cars off as cherries.  But
buyers are not stupid; recognizing their own inability to distinguish
among cars on the basis of quality, they reduce the price they are will-
ing to pay by enough to compensate for the risk they are buying a
lemon.
This set of arrangements and adjustments may work for a while.
The problem, however, is that it is likely to lead to an unsustainable
“non-equilibrium” in which some sellers of lemons receive a premium
30 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure
System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 751–52 (1984) (arguing that the existing mandatory disclosure
system is best explained by such an “efficiency-based” strategy); see also Paul A. Griffin et al.,
Stock Price Response to News of Securities Fraud Litigation: Market Efficiency and the Slow Diffusion
of Costly Information 7 (Stanford Law Sch. John M. Olin Program in Law & Econ., Working
Paper No. 208 2000), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
251766 (discussing several studies “document[ing] that the stock market reacts swiftly and
negatively to a corrective disclosure that leads to securities class action litigation”).
31 Akerlof, supra note 26. R
32 Id. at 490–91.
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over the actual value of their cars while many other sellers of cherries
are offered significantly less for their cars than they are worth.  Once
the buyers of the lemons discover that they have paid too much,
they—and those who hear their stories—either will withdraw from the
market or dramatically reduce the prices they offer to (the now dis-
credited) sellers in the market.  And once the sellers of cherries ob-
serve that they can no longer obtain a fair price for their cars, many of
those sellers—particularly those with the best cars—will decline to put
their cars on the market and will resort to other means of sale that do
not involve impersonal market transactions.  Such alternatives are
likely to include transactions within the seller’s “circle of trust” such as
family members or those with a close religious or ethnic affiliation.33
The withdrawal of the highest-quality cars from the market re-
sults, of course, in a reduction in the average quality of the cars on the
market.  As cherries are withdrawn from the market, buyers will re-
spond by adjusting downward the amount they are willing to pay to
reflect the new reduced average quality of the cars in the market,
which encourages still more sellers to withdraw their cars from the
market.  Soon, none of the best cars are available for sale and even
owners of average quality cars begin to receive too little compensation
for their vehicles.  Once the average-quality cars start to disappear
from the marketplace, buyers eventually recognize that the only cars
available on the market are lemons and will lower their prices accord-
ingly.  This downward spiral in quality and price ultimately leads, as
Akerlof’s model posits, to the complete failure of the market unless
market participants figure out a way to solve the information problem
confronting buyers and sellers.
Akerlof’s model applies with particular force in the context of the
capital markets in which securities trading occurs.  First, these markets
are characterized by acute information asymmetry.  Sellers of securi-
ties, particularly issuers or banks that have designed a particular trad-
ing instrument or developed the algorithm used to determine the
value of the instrument, will have significant information advantages
over their counterparties.34  Second, the intuition that buyers will
manage this information problem by paying a price for assets that re-
33 See, e.g., id. at 499 (providing examples in which lenders avoid the lemons problem
through personal knowledge of the contracting party’s character).
34 See PARTNOY, supra note 13, at 398, 402 (“The information and sophistication gap R
between average investors and the companies whose shares they buy is now bigger than
ever, thanks to the changes in markets, law, and culture since the late 1980s.”); see also
David Aboody & Baruch Lev, Information Asymmetry, R&D, and Insider Gains, 55 J. FIN. 2747,
2747 (2000) (noting that, because of information asymmetry, “corporate insiders,” which
the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act describes as “corporate officers, directors, and own-
ers of 10 percent or more of any equity class of securities,” benefit from trading their firms’
securities); cf. Vesna Straser, Regulation Fair Disclosure and Information Asymmetry 5 (Univ.
Notre Dame Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper 2002), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=311303 (noting that early disclosure of nonpublic informa-
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flects the anticipated average quality of those assets to compensate for
the risk of receiving low-quality assets seems particularly applicable to
the world of corporate finance.35  Following the principles of modern
portfolio theory, investors routinely attempt to construct diversified
portfolios of securities to eliminate the “firm-specific” risk (which
might be thought of as the possibility that a particular firm turns out
to be a lemon) associated with a particular investment.36  Third, tradi-
tional strategies for overcoming the problem of asymmetric informa-
tion at the heart of the lemons problem often do not work in the
context of financial products.
Traditional strategies for confronting the lemons problem, such
as offering product warranties, work well when the manufacturer is
offering many units of the same product and consumers are con-
cerned about the quality of the particular unit they are buying.  But in
the capital markets, the more typical concern is that an entire issue of
securities will fail to perform as promised.  Warranties, refunds, and
exchanges, which are all forms of insurance for buyers, do not work in
the context of securities offerings because when the issuer fails, all
investors tend to suffer together.37  Finally, stark differences around
the world in the quality of capital markets appear attributable to the
fact that the lemons problem is particularly acute in countries with
poorly developed legal and regulatory systems for the obvious reason
that, in such countries, sellers of securities are unable to commit cred-
ibly to telling the truth simply by submitting themselves to the sanc-
tions imposed by law.
Thus, developing mechanisms and institutions for coping with
the contracting problems generated by asymmetric information is
among the most important tasks for economists, lawyers, and policy-
makers.  The credit ratings, fairness opinions, and audits by indepen-
dent financial firms discussed in this Article are among the most
important mechanisms and institutions ever developed by markets.
The degradation caused by their assimilation into regulation has
proved very costly.
B. Agency Costs
As Michael Jensen and William Meckling famously explained,
both investors and entrepreneurs seeking investments have strong in-
centives to find ways to reduce agency costs because the investors and
entrepreneurs will share the gains associated with eliminating this
tion to securities analysts or institutional investors “place[s] individual investors at a severe
informational disadvantage”).
35 See David Easley & Maureen O’Hara, Adverse Selection and Large Trade Volume: The
Implications for Market Efficiency, 27 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 185, 185 (1992).
36 PARTNOY, supra note 13, at 415–16. See generally Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 R
J. FIN. 77 (1952) (discussing modern portfolio theory).
37 See Macey, supra note 27, at 22. R
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source of inefficiency.38  Among the farrago of mechanisms used to
align the interests of agents and principals are profit sharing, commis-
sion or piece-rate compensation, bonding through reputation build-
ing, and threats of firing or other disciplines.39
But these sorts of rather crude mechanisms for addressing
agency-cost problems sometimes present issues of their own.  Techni-
calities occasionally make it difficult to devise contractual solutions for
agency problems.  For example, firms often compensate employees on
the basis of their performance; in finance, employees such as traders
and professional money managers are compensated on the basis of
the returns generated by the portfolios of assets they assemble and
trade.  But these returns must be adjusted for the risks associated with
these investments or else the incentive-based compensation can lead
to the moral hazard of excessive risk-taking.40  Unfortunately, the
measurement of risk is more difficult, more subjective, and less pre-
cise than the measurement of returns.  The elaborate and expensive
internal risk assessment processes developed by financial firms were
an important step on the path toward developing more accurate and
precise measures of the risks associated with the assets held on and off
of the balance sheets of these institutions.41  Unfortunately, as the fol-
lowing section shows, the internal risk assessment process was cor-
rupted when government regulators assimilated these internal risk
assessments into their capital requirements for banks and other finan-
cial institutions.
II
FROM THE SUBLIME TO THE RIDICULOUS:  FOUR TALES
OF CO-OPTION
Markets must innovate in order to survive.  As transaction and
agency costs become more acute, the need to innovate becomes corre-
spondingly more acute.  It is difficult to identify markets in which the
transaction and agency cost problems are more severe than the securi-
ties markets.  Firms in search of investors’ capital must somehow cred-
ibly commit to being able to act in the best interests of the investors
who part with their money and have very little capacity to monitor or
control the firms in which they have invested.
As Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny have provocatively
observed:
38 See Michael C. Jensen & William C. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 323–25 (1976).
39 See id. at 323.
40 See PARTNOY, supra note 13, at 41, 181–82; Edwards, supra note 22, at 283–87. R
41 See Edwards, supra note 22, at 270–75; Hyndman, supra note 25, at 58–59.  In March R
1995, the top six Wall Street firms in the over-the-counter derivatives markets agreed to
follow the “Framework for Voluntary Oversight” by improving internal risk management
and controls and increasing disclosure of quantitative data to federal regulators in place of
formal governmental regulation. PARTNOY, supra note 13, at 153. R
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How do the suppliers of finance get managers to return some of the
profits to them?  How do they make sure that managers do not steal
the capital they supply or invest it in bad projects?  How do suppli-
ers of finance control managers?
At first glance, it is not entirely obvious why the suppliers of
capital get anything back.  After all, they part with their money, and
have little to contribute to the enterprise afterward.  The profes-
sional managers or entrepreneurs who run the firms might as well
abscond with the money.  Although they sometimes do, usually they
do not.42
From a legal perspective, the problem facing shareholders is even
more vexing than that facing suppliers of capital more generally
(bondholders, banks, and other fixed claimants).  Unlike fixed claim-
ants, shareholders are not entitled to dividends, much less capital ap-
preciation.43  Shareholders are residual claimants and, as such, are
paid only when, and if, the boards of directors of their firms deem it
appropriate.  And they will not as long as managers and directors
think that a company can invest the free cash flow of a firm more
efficiently than the shareholders could invest it if the company paid
taxes on it and then returned it to the shareholders in the form of
dividends.  Needless to say, shareholders are not entitled to any capi-
tal appreciation.  Their economic rights are virtually non-existent.
And their voting rights are not much more effective in providing any
assurance that their investments will not be appropriated at the first
opportunity by self-interested and rapacious officers and directors.44
Despite all of this, we actually observe, at least in some economies
during some time periods, not only “the flows of enormous amounts
of capital to firms” but also, perhaps even more astonishingly, the “ac-
tual repatriation of profits to the providers of finance.”45  It is worth
observing that such capital flows and capital repatriation predates the
emergence of the modern regulatory state.46  Thus, it must be the
42 Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737,
737 (1997).
43 See Jonathan Macey, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES BROKEN
29–30 (2008).
44 One of the most remarkable aspects of modern economic life is the fact that hun-
dreds of millions of investors have been persuaded to part with hundreds of billions of
dollars in exchange for residual claims on the cash flows of companies.  The securities that
represent these residual claims offer their owners virtually nothing in the way of formal,
legal protections.  Shareholders do not have the right to repayment of their principal, ever.
Companies issuing the equity claims have no obligation to repurchase the shares from
investors, regardless of how well or poorly the issuing companies perform.  These compa-
nies are not under any obligation to pay dividends or make any other sort of payments to
equity claimants. See id. at 29.
45 Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 42, at 737. R
46 See Charles R.P. Pouncy, Contemporary Financial Innovation: Orthodoxy and Alterna-
tives, 51 SMU L. REV. 505, 519–32 (1998) (providing a history of financial innovation start-
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case that the market mechanisms and institutions discussed in this sec-
tion are able to overcome the vast contracting problems facing compa-
nies in search of capital and potential investors.
A. The Making and Unmaking of Mandatory Credit Ratings
In a series of seminal articles, Frank Partnoy explains the way reg-
ulation has transformed the useful but rather narrowly focused credit
rating industry into a regulatory-enhanced juggernaut.  As Partnoy
points out, the regulatory environment created by the SEC and per-
petuated by a host of other state and federal regulatory agencies con-
veys significant regulatory benefits on those credit rating agencies that
have been fortunate enough to receive the SEC’s designation as NR-
SROs.  Partnoy explains that credit rating agencies are distinctly char-
acterized by an “oligopoly market structure that is reinforced by
regulations that depend exclusively on credit ratings issued by Nation-
ally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations . . . .”47
Prior to the intervention by the SEC, the credit rating agencies
enjoyed a significant boom during the 1920s and then fell into a pe-
riod of decline in the wake of the 1929 stock market crash.48  That
decline persisted until the early 1970s, when the SEC began to pro-
mulgate a series of highly technical and obscure regulations that
transformed the credit rating agencies into powerful monoliths in the
classic sense: rating agencies with the NRSRO designation that are
massive, unchanging, and difficult to deal with on a human scale.49
In 1975, the SEC imposed a uniform “net capital rule” on broker-
dealer firms.  The purpose of this rule was to insure that broker-dealer
firms regulated by the SEC would have sufficient resources (capital) to
meet their financial obligations to customers, counterparties, and
creditors.50  The SEC’s strategy for ensuring that brokers had suffi-
cient capital to meet their obligations was to require “every broker-
dealer to maintain at all times specified minimum levels of liquid as-
sets, or net capital, sufficient to enable a firm that falls below its mini-
mum requirement to liquidate in an orderly fashion.”51
It is important to note here that regulating capital is notoriously
difficult to do.  One of the bigger problems facing regulators is that
not all assets are alike, particularly with respect to characteristics such
as liquidity and risk.  This problem is compounded by the fact that,
ing in 3500 B.C.E., including the development of securities and bonds starting in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries).
47 Partnoy, supra note 9, at 60. R
48 See id. at 62–63.
49 See id. at 64–65; Pinto, supra note 7, at 343–44, 348. R
50 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (2011); SINCLAIR, supra note 2, at 42. R
51 Net Capital Requirements on Introducing Brokers’ Proprietary Accounts Assets
Held by Clearing Brokers, NYSE Interp. Memo 98-10 (Dec. 10, 1998).
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unlike returns, which are easy to measure accurately in real time, risk
and liquidity are extremely difficult to evaluate at all, and accurate
measurements are virtually impossible, particularly in real time.52
On a continuum measuring risk and liquidity, at one extreme
would be short-term debt obligations of the U.S. government, which
are highly liquid and virtually riskless.  At the other extreme would be
such things as unique individually negotiated commercial loans from
individual banks to small, obscure companies and complex, untraded
derivative instruments.  It would make no sense whatsoever to require
companies to maintain the same amount of capital to support assets
such as cash and U.S. government notes as they must maintain to sup-
port assets such as consumer loans, commercial loans, and invest-
ments in complex derivatives.
The SEC’s solution to this problem was to transform an existing
private sector institution into  a new quasi-government institution.
The old institution was the credit rating agency.  The new institution
into which the old credit rating agencies magically were transformed
was the NRSRO.  In an apparently well-intended effort to inject some
subtle gradations into its net capital rules, the SEC decided that bonds
and other debt obligations held by broker-dealers that had high rat-
ings from an NRSRO were safer (more liquid and stable) than other
unrated obligations.  As such, the SEC reasoned, broker-dealer firms
were allowed to hold less capital for the highly rated assets on their
balance sheets than what was required to offset the unrated (or poorly
rated) assets on their balance sheets.53
And, because capital is very expensive for financial firms, espe-
cially relative to debt,54 it was less costly for firms to hold qualifying
NRSRO-rated securities than other assets, all else equal.  The new net
capital rules thus created an incentive for banks to invest in highly
rated NRSRO securities, thereby raising the importance of credit rat-
ings to issuers.
52 Risk is difficult to measure: when we observe in retrospect the performance of a
financial asset, it is simple to measure the returns to investors by looking at capital gains
and periodic payments such as dividends or interest payments; for risk, there is no such
tangible measure, even after the fact. See ACCENTURE, NAVIGATING THE COMPLEXITIES OF
LIQUIDITY RISK 2 (2010), http://www.accenture.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/PDF/
Navigating_the_Complexities_of_Liquidity_Risk_Final_Low_Res.pdf (noting that “liquidity
risk [is] extraordinarily difficult to measure”).
53 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(c)(2)(vi)(E)–(H) (2011) (allowing deductions from the
net capital requirements if a security obtains a certain rating from NRSROs); SINCLAIR,
supra note 2, at 42; cf. Partnoy, supra note 9, at 64 (discussing the SEC’s decision to begin R
relying on the ratings of the NRSROs).
54 “[D]ebt is cheap and equity is expensive.”  Brad Case, Should Banks Hold More Capi-
tal? It Worked Out Great for REITs, SEEKING ALPHA (Feb. 6, 2011), http://seekingalpha.com/
article/251069-should-banks-hold-more-capital-it-worked-out-great-for-reits.
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The use of the NRSRO designation to determine how much capi-
tal a broker-dealer was required to have in order to comply with the
net capital rules was followed by an even more profound regulatory
co-option of the private sector role of credit rating agencies.  Here,
the obscure regulation is SEC Rule 2a-7, which pertains to what are
arguably the most important and fragile financial institutions in the
SEC’s domain: money market mutual funds.55
Mutual funds, are investment companies whose assets consist of
investments in securities issued by other corporations.  Money market
mutual funds are a particular subset of mutual funds that compete
with commercial banks by holding themselves out to the public as of-
fering stable asset prices that feature safe, stable repositories for li-
quidity.56  Money market mutual funds compete with bank checking
accounts by maintaining a stable net asset value of $1.00 per share.
This, in turn, permits investors in these funds to enjoy check-writing
privileges while still obtaining more competitive rates of return than
often are available from bank checking accounts.57
Money market funds are widely used by individual consumers and
by corporations.  Money market funds’ assets are extremely important
sources of short-term liquidity for investors and borrowers around the
world.58  Institutional investors use them as a cash-management tool.59
Money market mutual funds are by far the largest customers for com-
mercial paper and repurchase agreements (repos) in the world.60
In observing the emergence of money market mutual funds onto
the mutual fund landscape, the SEC felt compelled to devise regula-
tions that would limit the ability of mutual funds to deceive investors
by calling themselves money market mutual funds but not investing in
the very high quality and highly liquid assets that would enable the
55 See 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7 (2011).
56 See PARTNOY, supra note 13, at 129 (stating that money market mutual funds are R
“supposed to be ultra-safe, basically a substitute for cash or a checking account”).
57 See MARCIA STIGUM, THE MONEY MARKET 1176–78 (3d ed. 1990).  For a discussion of
how money market mutual funds function and benefit investors, see generally id. at
1176–1203.
58 Press Release, Jeffrey Gordon, Columbia Law Sch., SEC Punts on Financial Stability
Reform (Sept. 10, 2012), http://www.law.columbia.edu/media_inquiries/news_events/
2012/september2012/jeffrey-gordon-sec (describing money market funds as a “$3 trillion
financial intermediary”).
59 Assessing the Current Oversight and Operation of Credit Rating Agencies: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. 4 (2006) [hereinafter Hearing],
available at http://banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&File
Store_id=316a0acc-f3bc-4d8b-b09f-d013fb60e81b (statement of Paul Schott Stevens, Presi-
dent, Investment Company Institute).
60 See STIGUM, supra note 57, at 1180 (noting that mutual money funds place most of R
their money in, among other things, commercial paper and repos); Markus K. Brun-
nermeier, Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007–2008, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 77,
79–80 (2009) (noting a similar trend).
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funds to be able to withstand large-scale efforts by investors to obtain
liquidity by cashing in (redeeming) their investments simultaneously.
The SEC “solved” this problem by promulgating SEC Rule 2a-7.
Rule 2a-7 restricts the kinds of securities that funds calling themselves
money market mutual funds can invest in.  The purpose of the rule is
to make sure that the mutual fund invests in assets of sufficient quality
and liquidity that the fund will be able to maintain a stable net asset
value of one dollar even in times of significant stress and turmoil in
the markets.  Rule 2a-7, at the time of the financial crisis, provided
that money market funds would be limited to investing in securities
that were rated by an NRSRO in one of its two highest short-term
rating categories (unless the board of directors determined that an
unrated security was of comparable quality).  Rule 2a-7 also required
money market funds to continuously monitor the ratings of the securi-
ties in their portfolios and to respond appropriately in case of a
downgrade.61
Over time the reliance by regulatory agencies on the SEC’s NR-
SRO designation metastasized into the thousands, even defying schol-
ars’ efforts to quantify all of the regulations at the federal, state, and
local levels that relied on the NRSRO designation.62  The invention of
the NRSRO designation was very good for credit rating agencies.  This
regulation-driven demand for ratings motivated Thomas Friedman’s
witticism that there are only two superpowers in the world—the
United States and Moody’s—and that sometimes it was not clear
which was more powerful.63
Astonishingly, as Frank Partnoy has observed, when Thomas
Friedman made his famous quip, the credit rating agencies had not
even begun their meteoric rise.  Moody’s, the only publicly traded NR-
SRO, had operating revenues, profitability, capitalization, and market
share consistent with that of a participant in a government-protected
cartel.64  The value of Moody’s stock increased more than 300% in the
five-year period prior to the 2007 market crash as the demand for rat-
ing agencies’ services blossomed as more and more exotic credit deriv-
atives were issued (and rated).65
61 Hearing, supra note 59, at 4–5. R
62 See Frank Partnoy, The Paradox of Credit Ratings, in RATINGS, RATING AGENCIES AND
THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 65, 74–78 (Richard M. Levich et al. eds., 2002) [hereinafter
Partnoy, Paradox of Credit Ratings].
63 Interview by David Gergen with Thomas L. Friedman (Feb. 13, 1996).
64 Accord Partnoy, supra note 9, at 65 (discussing Moody’s financial performance since R
2000).
65 See id. at 66–67; U.S. S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, COMM. ON HOME-
LAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, WALL STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: ANAT-
OMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE 256–58 (2011).
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Also, significantly, around this period, the largest credit rating
agencies—Moody’s, Fitch, and Standard and Poor’s (S&P)—began to
charge the issuers for ratings.66  Previously, these credit rating agen-
cies generated revenue by selling subscriptions to publications that
contained, among other material, the ratings they generated.67  The
credit rating agencies designated as NRSROs “have benefited from an
oligopoly market structure that is reinforced by regulations that de-
pend exclusively on credit ratings issued by Nationally Recognized Sta-
tistical Rating Organizations (NRSROs).  These regulatory benefits . . .
generate economic rents for NRSROs that persist even when they per-
form poorly.”68
And perform poorly they do.  Empirical studies indicate that
credit ratings contain little, if any, timely or accurate information
about issuers.69  While many have observed the poor performance of
the credit rating agencies and lamented the distortions caused by the
NRSRO designation, none have suggested, as I do, that there is a
causal link between the NRSRO designation and the rating agencies’
poor performance.  Professor Partnoy, for example, takes the view
that credit rating agencies never performed well.  But if credit rating
agencies always performed poorly, it is unclear why they were, at least
at one time, of value to investors and issuers.70  Rather it appears that
credit rating agencies played a very modest role in corporate finance
until the NRSRO designation uncoupled their profits from their
performance.
Historically, “the only reason that rating agencies [were] able to
charge fees at all [was] because the public ha[d] enough confidence
in the integrity of these ratings to find them of value in evaluating the
riskiness of investments.”71  Before companies were required to obtain
ratings for their newly issued debt (so that their customers would be
66 See Partnoy, supra note 9, at 64 (“[C]redit rating agencies abandoned their histori- R
cal practice of charging investors for subscriptions and instead began charging issuers for
ratings . . . .”).
67 See Lawrence J. White, The Credit Rating Industry: An Industrial Organization Analysis,
in RATINGS, RATING AGENCIES AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM, supra note 62, at 41, 47. R
Professor White attributes this shift to the development of low-cost photocopying, which
limited the credit rating agencies’ ability to prevent free riding on the ratings they gener-
ated by nonpayers.
68 Partnoy, supra note 9, at 60. R
69 See Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs Down for the
Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619, 647–48, 658–59 (1999) [hereinafter Partnoy,
Siskel and Ebert].
70 See Richard Sylla, A Historical Primer on the Business of Credit Rating, in RATINGS, RAT-
ING AGENCIES, AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM, supra note 62, at 19, 23–30 (discussing R
the market forces that led to the development of credit rating agencies and their
contributions).
71 Jonathan R. Macey, Wall Street Versus Main Street: How Ignorance, Hyperbole, and Fear
Lead to Regulation, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1487, 1500 (1998) (book review).
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permitted by regulators to buy such debt), the only rationale for pay-
ing for a credit rating was that the cost of obtaining the rating was
lower than the benefit, which came in the form of lower borrowing
costs for debt that was subjected to the scrutiny of the credit rating
agencies.
Nevertheless, it is not at all clear from the historical evidence that
credit rating agencies ever were particularly good at generating accu-
rate ratings.  As Martin Fridson has observed, the historical evidence
shows correlation between some massive mistakes (like Enron)72 and
a tendency toward ratings inflation, but there also has been a correla-
tion between ratings, defaults and losses, and net returns, suggesting
that ratings did historically generate some information of value to in-
vestors.73  From this perspective, it appears that a major part of the
problem that government regulation created in the credit rating con-
text was that the NRSRO designation caused credit ratings to be taken
too seriously.  Credit ratings, which used to be a mere sideshow in
American corporate finance, became the main attraction in the capi-
tal markets’ biggest tents.
Moreover, to a large extent, credit ratings are a product of mar-
ket inefficiency.  Credit ratings are necessary in order to compensate
for a lack of market-generated information.74  Over time, as informa-
tion technology improves and competition among market participants
increases, information asymmetry problems lessen, and one would ex-
pect that the natural evolution of the capital markets would be toward
less reliance on credit ratings.75  Instead, of course, because of the
NRSRO designation, credit ratings have become more rather than less
important.
The phenomenon of rising demand for credit ratings over time
does not appear to be the result of either improved credit ratings or
deteriorating capital markets.  In fact, the data suggests the oppo-
site.76  Empirical studies have documented that yield spreads of corpo-
72 Claire A. Hill, Why Did Anyone Listen to the Rating Agencies After Enron?, 4 J. BUS. &
TECH. L. 283, 283 (2009).
73 Martin Fridson, Bond Rating Agencies: Conflicts and Competence, 22 J. APPLIED CORP.
FIN. 56, passim (2010).
74 See supra Part I.A (discussing the problem of information asymmetry).
75 As markets become more efficient, ratings become less relevant because in an effi-
cient market, the information gleaned from ratings will be contained in securities prices
themselves.  The role of credit ratings is to help close the information gap between lenders
and borrowers by providing independent opinions of creditworthiness. See The Role of
Credit Ratings in the Financial System (May 17, 2012, 2:24 PM), http://www.standardand
poors.com/ratings/articles/en/us/?articleType=HTML&assetID=1245333793833; see also
Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 79 VA. L. REV.
594, 609–12 (1984) (discussing various mechanisms through which financial markets be-
come more efficient).
76 See Koresh Galil, The Quality of Corporate Credit Rating: An Empirical Investiga-
tion 6 (Oct. 2003) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Eitan Berglas School of Economics,
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rate bonds start to expand as credit quality deteriorates but before a
rating downgrade.77  These results cast doubt on the informational
value of credit ratings because they indicate that prices in the capital
markets generally anticipate future downgrades by the credit rating
agencies.  This data also suggests that differences in yields among se-
curities (credit spreads)—the varying rates of return that investors can
expect when buying securities with higher or lower yields—reflects
the increases (or decreases) in risk associated with these various
investments.
Once credit ratings were co-opted by the government’s NRSRO
designations, not only did their business explode but their basic busi-
ness model changed as well.  Quality became less important because
the NRSRO regulatory framework decoupled the quality of the ratings
generated by the credit rating agencies from the demand for their
services.  Thus, the rational response from the credit rating agencies
was to lower costs.  As Frank Partnoy has suggested, the growth in size
and profitability in credit ratings likely is attributable to cost savings:
Both S&P and Moody’s have high levels of staff turnover, modest
salary levels and limited upward mobility; moreover, investment
banks poach the best rating agency employees.  These factors limit
the ability of rating agencies to generate valuable information.
In addition, the process agencies use today to generate ratings
does not obtain any obvious advantages over competing informa-
tion providers and analysts.  Credit rating agencies do not indepen-
dently verify information supplied to them by issuers, and all rating
agencies get the same data.  Both Moody’s and S&P make rating
determinations in secret.  The agencies never describe their terms
or analysis precisely or say, for example, that a particular rating has
a particular probability of default[,] and they stress that the ratings
are qualitative and judgmental.  This secretive, qualitative process is
not the type of process one would expect if the agencies had sur-
vived based on their ability to accumulate reputational capital.  On
the other hand, such processes make it more likely that an agency
would be able to survive in a noncompetitive market; if the rating
process had been public or quantitative (rather than qualitative),
other market entrants easily could have duplicated the rating agen-
cies’ technology and methodology.78
Tel-Aviv University), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
406681 (concluding that S&P ratings during the sample period, from 1983 to 1994, are
“not fully informative” in regards to predicting default, as “[t]he probabilities of default for
two adjacent rating categories are not significantly different from each other”).
77 See Doron Kliger & Oded Sarig, The Information Value of Bond Ratings, 55 J. FIN.
2879, 2880 (2000) (noting MacDonald Wakeman’s 1981 study argued that rating changes
“lag rather than lead security-price changes”).
78 Partnoy, Paradox of Credit Ratings, supra note 62, at 72–73 (footnote omitted). R
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\98-3\CRN301.txt unknown Seq: 22 11-MAR-13 9:55
612 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98:591
The consequences of the misguided decision to incorporate
credit ratings into securities and capital markets regulations were se-
vere.  The evidence shows that, whatever the quality and reliability of
credit ratings might have been prior to the end of the twentieth cen-
tury, the rating agencies failed dismally between 2001 and 2008.  As
Thomas Gorman and many others have observed,
[c]redit rating agencies, and in particular, nationally recognized sta-
tistical rating organizations (“NRSRO”), have been thought by many
to be at the center of much of what went on with the market crisis,
particularly in the area of structured products.  The agencies have
come under significant criticism for their methodologies, lack of
procedures and conflicts of interest.79
The evidence strongly suggests that credit rating agencies low-
ered their standards between 2001 and 2008, especially with respect to
their ratings of structured financial instruments.80  In particular, as
Fridson points out, many credit default obligations received arguably
“undeserved Triple-A ratings”81 during this period, making it simply
“impossible to defend the agencies’ . . . ratings of mortgage-related
79 Thomas O. Gorman, Dodd-Frank Impact on Credit Rating Agencies, LEXISNEXIS COM-
MUNITIES (Aug. 24, 2010, 9:39 AM), http://www.lexisnexis.com/COMMUNITY/CORP-
SEC/blogs/corporateandsecuritieslawblog/archive/2010/08/24/dodd-frank-impact-on-
credit-rating-agencies.aspx.
80 Structured finance is the catchall term for financial transactions that create new,
often complex, legal entities (special purpose vehicles) whose sole purpose is to issue debt
securities on a stand-alone basis (meaning the entities had no business of their own apart
from issuing securities) in which the repayment of principal and interest on the securities
created is based on the cash flows generated by assets such as mortgages, credit card receiv-
ables, and car loans. See Andreas A. Jobst, A Primer on Structured Finance, 13 J. DERIVATIVES &
HEDGE FUNDS 199, 200–01 (2007).  Structured financial instruments include a wide variety
of securities issued by specialized entities, primarily: asset-backed securities, mortgage-
backed securities, collateralized mortgage obligations, collateralized debt obligations, col-
lateralized bond obligations, and collateralized obligations of hedge funds and private eq-
uity funds. See id. at 201–02.  In technical terms, structured investments typically (i)
combine traditional asset classes with contingent claims, such as risk transfer derivatives or
derivative claims on commodities, currencies or receivables from other reference assets, or
(ii) replicate traditional asset classes through synthetication or new financial instruments.
Structured finance is invoked by financial and nonfinancial institutions in both banking
systems and capital markets if either (i) established forms of external finance are unavaila-
ble (or depleted) for a particular financing need, or (ii) traditional sources of funds are
too expensive for issuers to mobilize sufficient funds for what would otherwise be an unat-
tractive investment based on the issuer’s desired cost of capital.  Structured finance offers
issuers enormous flexibility to create securities with distinct risk-return profiles in terms of
maturity structure, security design, and asset type, providing enhanced return at a cus-
tomised degree of diversification commensurate to an individual investor’s appetite for
risk.  Hence, structured finance contributes to a more complete capital market by offering
any mean–variance trade-off along the efficient frontier of optimal diversification at lower
transaction cost.  The increasing complexity of the structured finance market and the ever-
growing range of products being made available to investors, however, invariably create
challenges in terms of efficient management and dissemination of information. Id. at
200–01.
81 Fridson, supra note 73, at 60. R
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collateralized debt obligations”82 because fully “89% of the investment
grade mortgage-backed securities ratings that Moody’s awarded in
2007 were subsequently reduced to speculative grade.”83
Rating-structured financial obligations such as collateralized debt
obligations (CDOs) is particularly difficult for credit rating agencies it
seems:
[W]hen a rating agency rates a mortgage-related CDO, it may have
greater difficulty controlling the conflict that arises from the issuer-
pay model.  To begin with, the issuer is not an existing company
with a new need for capital.  Rather, the prospective offering has
come about because an underwriter has structured a financing
around a pool of mortgages.  The deal is contingent on selling the
senior tranche to investors who will accept a comparatively low yield
in exchange for a very high level of perceived safety.  Therefore, if
the bankers are not fairly confident of being able to obtain a Triple-
A rating on the senior tranche, they will not even bother to com-
mence work on the deal.  In that case, the CDO will not be created
and the rating agencies will receive no revenue.84
The NRSRO regulatory framework ultimately created a “competitive”
environment in which the oligopolistic credit rating agencies issuing
NRSRO ratings inevitably would come to view the most rational busi-
ness model to be that of supplying ratings not for the purpose of con-
veying information but for the purpose of providing prophylactic
protection against various risks, including litigation risk and the risk
of underperforming against one’s rivals.85
In response to the simultaneous increased reliance on and deteri-
orating quality of ratings, regulators recently have begun to try to fix
the problem they caused in inventing the NRSRO designation.  The
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-
Frank) created a new office of credit ratings that is responsible for
administering the processes by which NRSROs calculate credit ratings.
This office is tasked with conducting an annual audit of each NRSRO
and issuing a public report on the NRSRO’s performance.86
In order to improve the flawed credit ratings, the SEC, which in
my view actually caused the poor quality of the ratings by inventing
the NRSRO concept in the first place, now is responsible for the cor-
porate governance of the credit rating agencies.  Each NRSRO is re-
82 Id. at 56.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 58.
85 See Partnoy, Siskel and Ebert, supra note 69, at 681–82, 690–703. R
86 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank
Act), Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 932(a)(8)(p)(1), 124 Stat. 1376, 1877 (codified in scattered
sections of U.S.C. (Supp. IV 2011) (“The Commission shall establish within the Commis-
sion an Office of Credit Ratings.”); Gorman, supra note 79. R
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quired by Dodd-Frank to have a board of directors that is responsible
for overseeing a system of internal controls over the policies and pro-
cedures used to determine ratings and other internal issues, such as
promotion and compensation.87
Dodd-Frank requires the SEC to regulate credit rating agencies in
a number of additional ways.  New rules must be promulgated to: (a)
preclude ratings from being influenced by sales and marketing;88 (b)
define the meaning of rating symbols and require that they be used
consistently;89 (c) require each NRSRO to establish, maintain, and en-
force policies and procedures that “clearly define and disclose the
meaning of any symbol used by the [NRSRO] to denote a credit rat-
ing” and apply any such symbol “in a manner that is consistent for all
types of securities and money market instruments for which the sym-
bol is used”;90 (d) require that each NRSRO assess and disclose the
probability that an issuer will default or otherwise not make payments
in accord with the terms of the instrument;91 (e) establish the criteria
for the qualifications, knowledge, experience, and training of persons
who perform ratings;92 (f) require the disclosure of information that
will permit the accuracy of ratings and foster comparability among the
agencies to be evaluated;93 and (g)  require the disclosure, on a form
which will accompany each rating issued, of information about the
underlying assumptions, procedures, and methodologies employed as
well as the data used in establishing the rating.94  These provisions are
all based on the idea that SEC regulation can improve the quality of
the ratings generated by the NRSROs.
Dodd-Frank also makes it easier for investors to sue credit rating
agencies.95  This provision, of course, is based on the notion that the
threat of liability can improve quality of the ratings generated by the
NRSROs.96
87 See Dodd-Frank Act § 932(a)(2)(B)(3) (requiring establishment of internal control
structure); id. § 932(a)(8)(t) (“Each nationally recognized statistical rating organization







94 § 932(a)(8)(s)(1)–(3).  The Act mandates that the SEC require NRSROs to “pre-
scribe a form to accompany the publication of each credit rating that discloses” assump-
tions used, data, and use of servicer or remittance reports, as well as “information that can
be used by investors and other users of credit ratings to better understand credit ratings in
each class of credit rating issued by the nationally recognized statistical rating organiza-
tion.”  § 932(a)(8)(s)(1).
95 See Gorman, supra note 79. R
96 Dodd-Frank Act § 931(3).
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The sequence of events culminating in the provisions of Dodd-
Frank related to credit rating agencies is strongly supportive of the
hypothesis of this Article, which is that government co-option of pri-
vate institutions tends to cause the deterioration of such institutions.
First, the government co-opted credit rating agencies by relying on
NRSRO’s credit ratings to regulate financial institutions.  This regula-
tion ultimately distorted credit rating agencies’ incentives and re-
moved their prior market-driven incentives to produce high quality
ratings.  But the regulation also created more dependence on credit
ratings than ever before.  This in turn created an acute need for more
regulation (which came in the form of Dodd-Frank) aimed at improv-
ing the poor performance of the credit rating agencies that the prior
regulations caused in the first place.
Congress’s recognition in Dodd-Frank of the failures resulting
from regulators’ co-option of credit rating agencies went even further
than these new regulations of credit rating agencies.  Section 939A of
Dodd-Frank requires the SEC to review its myriad regulations refer-
encing credit ratings and to modify those regulations so as to “remove
any reference to or requirement of reliance on credit ratings.”97  In
place of these credit ratings, the SEC must promulgate “standard[s] of
credit-worthiness as each respective agency shall determine as appro-
priate for such regulations.”98
The implications of this rule change are manifold.  In particular,
the investment advisors who manage money market funds, at least in
theory, should no longer rely automatically on the credit ratings gen-
erated by NRSROs when making investment decisions; money market
fund managers will have to analyze their investments on their own.99
Removing reliance on the credit rating agencies will reduce systemic
risk by decreasing the tendency of mutual funds to have investments
that are highly correlated with (i.e., the same as) the investments of
other mutual funds.100  Prior to Dodd-Frank, mutual funds advisers
and other money managers were tempted to pick the highest-yielding
assets within any particular ratings category in order to maximize the
97 § 939A(b).
98 Id.
99 See Christopher J. Zimmerman, Over- or Under-Rated? The SEC Proposes Credit Rating
Amendments Impacting Money Market Funds, 18 INVESTMENT L. 1, 4–6 (2011), available at
http://www.stradley.com/library/files/investment_lawyer_-_chris_zimmerman_au-
thored_-_may_2011.pdf (discussing the impact of the new rules on money market funds,
observing that the purpose of these rules is to diminish reliance on credit ratings, and
predicting that, while firms will continue to rely on ratings in the short run, this reliance
may diminish over time).
100 See Sushil Bikhchandani & Sunil Sharma, Herd Behaviors in Financial Markets, 47 IMF
STAFF PAPERS 279, 282 (2000) (“Intentional herding may be inefficient and . . . can lead to
excess volatility and systemic risk.” (footnote omitted)).
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risk-adjusted returns associated with their investments.101  Requiring
money managers to make decisions on the basis of their own risk anal-
ysis rather than relying on credit rating agencies will, therefore, at
least in part, reduce the systemic risk caused by the “herd behavior” of
money managers.102
To the extent that regulators must now remove the regulatory co-
option of the credit rating designation, credit rating agencies will have
to once again compete on the basis of the quality of their ratings as
the artificial demand for their services created by regulation subsides.
Ironically, this means that the quality of the ratings generated by the
agencies should improve just as professional money managers become
less reliant on their use.  In retrospect, the creation and expansion of
the NRSRO designation can be viewed as an experiment with the reg-
ulatory co-option of privately generated credit ratings.  Clearly this ex-
periment failed; the very act of incorporating credit ratings into the
regulatory framework changed the incentives of the companies issu-
ing such ratings and ultimately corrupted the quality of the ratings
themselves.
B. Selling Indulgences:  The Judicial Co-Option of Fairness
Opinions
For officers and directors of U.S. public companies, fundamental
corporate decisions are dangerous events.  Even when officers and di-
rectors are negotiating and structuring transactions that promise huge
profits for shareholders, the risk is great that the directors and officers
considering these transactions will be sued by attorneys purporting to
represent either shareholders—complaining that the price obtained
by the company for its assets was too low—or creditors—complaining
that the price obtained by the company for its assets was too low or
involved too much debt and thereby decreased the value of the credi-
tors’ claims.
The plaintiffs bringing these claims typically structure their law-
suits as class actions or derivative suits.  The complaints generally al-
101 Timothy E. Lynch, Deeply and Persistently Conflicted: Credit Rating Agencies in the Cur-
rent Regulatory Environment, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 227, 284–85 (2009) (explaining that
investors’ “herding behavior” was in part caused by the supposed authority of credit rating
agencies in evaluating risk); see Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, and Corpo-
rate Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 265, 314–15 (2012) (exploring the various incentives for
asset managers to engage in herd behavior); cf. PARTNOY, supra note 13, at 132 (noting that R
in the 1990s “fund managers all seemed to be buying the same financial instruments”).
102 See David S. Scharfstein & Jeremy C. Stein, Herd Behavior and Investment, 80 AM.
ECON. REV. 465, 477 (1990) (describing the reasons for herd behavior as applied to the
stock market). See generally Abhijit V. Banerjee, A Simple Model of Herd Behavior, 107 Q.J.
ECON. 797 (1992) (setting out a model of herd behavior); Bikhchandani & Sharma, supra
note 100 (providing an overview of recent theoretical and empirical research on herd R
behavior).
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lege that the corporate managers approving a significant transaction
breached their common law fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, or good
faith in making their decision.103  Litigation of this kind is considered
to be—along with markets, contracts, norms, and other structural fea-
tures—an important part of the corporate governance framework that
constrains corporate managers.104
In response to the omnipresent threat of litigation, corporate of-
ficers and directors seek guidance from lawyers about how to reduce
this threat.  These corporate officers and directors, of course, pay rapt
attention to the suggestions that judges make about how corporate
actors should conduct themselves when making major decisions.
One major defensive weapon in managements’ arsenal is the fair-
ness opinion.  Fairness opinions generally take the form of letters, ad-
dressed to the board of directors of a corporation that is in the
process of making an important decision, that articulate the opinion
of the letters’ issuer as to the adequacy or “fairness[ ] from a financial
point of view” of a particular course of action.105  Fairness opinions
generally contain detailed valuations of the company being bought
and sold.
For years, courts have emphasized that board members can rely
on fairness opinions as an integral part of their decision-making pro-
cess.  Such opinions are an important aid in the quest of directors to
obtain the protections from liability provided by the business judg-
ment rule.106
103 Cf. Cheryl Gross Weiss, A Review of the Historic Foundations of Broker-Dealer Liability for
Breach of Fiduciary Duty, 23 J. CORP. L. 65 (1998) (examining the historical development of
a broker-dealer’s fiduciary duty to investors and customers).
104 See, e.g., PARTNOY, supra note 13, at 167–71.  Professor Partnoy notes that class ac- R
tion lawsuits supplied a more important threat of liability than government prosecution, at
least until the mid-1990s when Congress and courts made securities legislation harder to
pursue. Id. at 171–72.
105 See, e.g., J.Crew Group, Inc., Proxy Statement Annex B (Schedule 14A) (Dec. 6,
2010), available at http://edgar.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1051251/00011931251027
4106/dprem14a.htm#toc121900_28a (Fairness Opinion of Perella Weinberg in the TPG
acquisition of J.Crew); Schering-Plough Corp., Registration Statement Annex B (Form S-4)
(May 20, 2009), available at http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/310158/00009501230900
9217/y77207sv4.htm#213 (JPMorgan’s Fairness Opinion in the Merck acquisition of Scher-
ing-Plough); see also HOULIGAN CAPITAL, FAIRNESS OPINIONS: USES & ISSUES 1, http://www.
houlihan.com/ace-files/FairnessOpinionsUsesandIssues.pdf (explaining that a fairness
opinion is “a letter prepared by an . . . investment  banker . . . which states whether or not a
transaction—from a financial point of view—is fair”).
106 Where the business judgment rule applies to a corporate decision, the directors
making the decision are presumed to have made their decision on the basis of a “bona fide
regard for the interests of the corporation whose affairs the stockholders have committed
to their charge.”  Gimbel v. Signal Cos., 316 A.2d 599, 608 (Del. Ch. 1974).  Where direc-
tors have the protection of the business judgment rule, they are insulated from liability
except in the exceedingly rare situation where the plaintiff is able to prove that the “direc-
tors, in reaching their challenged decision, breached any one of the triads of their fiduciary
duty—good faith, loyalty or due care.”  Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361
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Over time, despite occasional protestations by courts to the con-
trary, as a practical matter, there developed “the widespread belief
that a fairness opinion is required for protection under the business
judgment rule.”107  For example, in the seminal case Smith v. Van
Gorkom,108 although the Delaware Supreme Court expressly observed
that fairness opinions were not required under Delaware law, the
court did impose liability on directors in that case; notably, the fact
that the board had failed to obtain a fairness opinion clearly did not
help its case.109  It seems plausible that obtaining a fairness opinion
“would have insulated the directors from liability,” and this, in turn,
translated into the creation of what accurately has been described as
“an informal requirement.”110  Since January 1985, when the Dela-
ware Supreme Court ruled against the directors of Trans Union
Corporation in Van Gorkom, fairness opinions have become
“customary.”111
In this way, fairness opinions are no longer simply a source of
information about a proposed transaction or financing.  Rather, ob-
taining a fairness opinion has become like the practice of buying in-
dulgences prior to the Protestant Reformation, but for sins that one is
(Del. 1993) (citations omitted).  If the plaintiff cannot sustain the burden of proving bad
faith, disloyalty, or gross negligence, the plaintiff “is not entitled to any remedy unless the
transaction constitutes waste.” In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 74 (Del.
2006) (footnote omitted).
107 Helen M. Bowers, Fairness Opinions and the Business Judgment Rule: An Empirical Inves-
tigation of Target Firms’ Use of Fairness Opinions, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 567, 571 (2002).
108 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
109 Id. at 876–81 (“[W]e [do not] state that fairness opinions by independent invest-
ment bankers are required as a matter of law.”).
110 Charles M. Elson, The Duty of Care, Compensation, and Stock Ownership, 63 U. CINN. L.
REV. 649, 677 (1995) (footnote omitted); see Daniel R. Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule
and the Trans Union Case, 40 BUS. L. 1437, 1453 (1985) (asserting that after Van Gorkom,
“no firm considering a fundamental corporate change will do so without obtaining a fair-
ness letter”); Stephen I. Glover & Doretha M. VanSlyke, Fairness Opinion Issues: Anything but
Routine, NAT’L L.J., Apr. 15, 1996, at C13 (discussing the ubiquitous presence of fairness
opinions in merger transactions, even when the companies “agree to merge without help
from financial advisers”); Michael J. Kennedy, Functional Fairness—The Mechanics, Functions
and Liabilities of Fairness Opinions, in HANDLING HIGH-TECH M&AS IN A COOLING MARKET:
ENSURING THAT YOU GET VALUE 605, 607 (2001) (noting that fairness opinions are deliv-
ered “in almost any transaction of note involving public companies”); Bill Shaw & Edward
J. Gac, Fairness Opinions in Leveraged Buy Outs: Should Investment Bankers Be Directly Liable to
Shareholders?, 23 SEC. REG. L.J. 293, 293 (1995) (“Over the last decade, the fairness opinion
has become a necessary and integral aspect of every major corporate control transaction.
Directors feel they must seek the advice and blessing of investment banks before engaging
in an action that requires them to enter the thicket of conflicting interests.”); cf. Andrew
Ross Sorkin, A Dual Role for Lehman in Deal Talks, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2005, at C1, available at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C0DE3D81738F930A35755C0A963
9C8B63 (noting that a deal was especially unusual because the acquiring board did not
seek a fairness opinion).
111 Paul Sweeney, Who Says It’s a Fair Deal?, 8 J. ACCT. 44, 45 (1999).
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about to commit instead of for past sins.112  The practice is very wide-
spread113 but is not entirely legitimate.
In addition to the widespread use of fairness opinions, companies
retained investment bankers to provide them with advisory services
even more regularly than they retained such banks to furnish them
with fairness opinions.114  Clearly judges’ opinions in fiduciary duty
cases, particularly the opinion articulated in Van Gorkom, increased
the demand for financial advisory services.  On average, sixty-one per-
cent of target firms report obtaining fairness opinions.115  The per-
centage of firms using fairness opinions was in decline prior to Van
Gorkom, but the percentage increased dramatically following this deci-
sion.116  The frequency of firms reporting the use of investment
banks’ advisory services has, in contrast, held steady at over ninety
percent.117
Significantly, in my view, the data show that the use of fairness
opinions in corporate acquisitions was extremely widespread prior to
the 1985 decision in Van Gorkom.  As shown in Figure 1,118 for exam-
ple, in 1980, fully ninety percent of target companies involved in ac-
quisitions obtained fairness opinions.  Figure 1 also shows that the use
of fairness opinions was on a steady decline until 1982, when it exper-
ienced a one-year uptick before continuing its sharp downward trend
that ended only in 1985 when the Delaware Supreme Court decided
Van Gorkom.
112 In the Catholic faith, an indulgence is a reduction or diminution in the punish-
ment that otherwise would be owed for a sin committed.  Abuses in selling and granting
indulgences provided a significant motivation for the Protestant Reformation initiated by
Martin Luther in 1517.
113 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, Fairness Opinions: How Fair Are They and
What Can Be Done About It?, 1989 DUKE L.J. 27, 27 (1989) (noting that fairness opinions
“have become a regular feature of every major corporate control transaction,” such as “ne-
gotiated mergers, freeze-out mergers, hostile tender offers, friendly tender offers, self-ten-
ders, leveraged buyouts, negotiated share repurchases, [and] negotiated sales of treasury
stock” (footnotes omitted)).
114 See Bowers, supra note 107, at 573–74, 577. R
115 Id. at 577.
116 Id. at 573–74 (noting that in the year following Van Gorkom, use of fairness opinions
jumped from 19% to 42% and “use of opinions generally increased throughout the re-
mainder of the 1980s”).  Professor Bowers also found that the frequency of use after the
late 1980s returned to levels similar to before Van Gorkom.  See id. at 574–75.
117 Id. at 577.
118 Id. at 573.
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FIGURE 1: COMPARISON OF THE PERCENTAGE OF TARGET FIRMS USING
ADVISORY SERVICES AND FAIRNESS OPINIONS
The percentages indicate the portion of target firms in that year that reported obtaining a 
fairness opinion and/or advisory services from at least one financial advisor.  Firms that 
obtained fairness opinions may have also obtained advisory services from the same or a 
different financial advisor.  The target firm may have employed the same or additional 
financial advisors for other services related to the transaction such as arranging financing.
All completed acquisitions announced between January 1, 1980 and December 31, 1999 
between publicly traded, nonfinancial firms where the value of the transaction is at least 
$10 million.  Data source: Thomson Financial, Inc.
SOURCE: Helen M. Bowers, Fairness Opinions and the Business Judgment Rule: An Empirical 
Investigation of Target Firms’ Use of Fairness Opinions, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 567, 573 (2002).
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This, in turn, strongly suggests that, at least prior to 1985, the
demand for fairness opinions was driven by a genuine desire on the
part of directors and officers to get the benefit of an investment
banker’s judgment about whether the price being considered in a par-
ticular control transaction was fair.  During this period of time, invest-
ment banks and other firms generating fairness opinions were
concerned about maintaining the value of their reputational capital.
This desire provided them with incentives to produce fairness opin-
ions that were economically valid and untainted by conflicts of
interest.119
119 See Stephen Choi, Market Lessons for Gatekeepers, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 916, 934–36
(1998) (discussing the market forces that drive competition between certifiers such as in-
vestment companies who issue fairness opinions).
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Following Van Gorkom, however, the demand for fairness opinions
became decoupled from the quality of those opinions for several rea-
sons.  First, the courts evaluating fairness opinions did not seem to
particularly care about whether the bank generating the fairness opin-
ion had a reputation for producing accurate and reliable valua-
tions.120  It appears that an opinion from any well-known investment
bank would suffice.  This, in turn, created a “competitive” environ-
ment, in which the cartel of well-known investment banks issuing fair-
ness opinions would rationally view their business model as supplying
opinions not for the purpose of conveying information but for provid-
ing prophylactic protection against litigation risk.  In this environ-
ment, the rational, profit-maximizing strategy would be for firms
offering fairness opinions to compete for market share by offering
fairness opinions with the results preferred by target company boards
of directors.  Banks offering these sorts of opinions would, it would
seem, be more likely to be retained by companies than competitors
who suffered the reputation of offering fairness opinions with results
that target management did not want to receive.
Providers of fairness opinions have little difficulty determining
the precise opinions that their clients want to hear.  Generally, the
people generating fairness opinions know the terms of the deal they
are evaluating, including the price of the offer.  They also know
whether the management or boards of directors who have retained
them approve of the proposed deal or not.  Advisors usually have ex-
perience with the management team that hires them to render a fair-
ness opinion.121
There might be room for entry into the business of offering fair-
ness opinions by firms who can develop a reputation for offering relia-
ble opinions.  However, the co-option of fairness opinions into
fiduciary duty analysis has distorted those incentives.  Prospective new
entrants are hobbled in the post-Van Gorkom regulatory environment
because such new entrants would, ironically, likely not be as useful in
protecting boards’ decisions from legal attack precisely because they
are not well known to courts.  Directors would find themselves in the
awkward position of having to explain to skeptical plaintiffs’ attorneys
and judges why they decided to seek a fairness opinion from an un-
known parvenu instead of a well-known, long-established firm such as
Goldman Sachs.
So, two facts emerge from this analysis.  First, although fairness
opinions are not, strictly speaking, required by law, bankers are almost
always retained to offer fairness opinions in deals involving the sale of
120 See Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 113, at 43–44 & n.92 (noting that courts have not R
paid much attention to the trustworthiness of investment firms issuing fairness opinions).
121 Bowers, supra note 107, at 577. R
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public companies or other transactions in which directors face litiga-
tion risk.122  At the same time, unfortunately, it is also the case that the
banks that prepare fairness opinions never say that the transaction
that they are evaluating is actually “unfair.”123  Rather, the fairness
opinion has been transformed into a mere “rubber stamp” that is used
“to justify the deal” under consideration to litigious investors.124
Even those who support the notion that fairness opinions might
potentially be of use to investors in the current regulatory environ-
ment conclude that the banks issuing such opinions must be tightly
regulated.125  Unfortunately, these scholars apparently ignore the fact
that the reason why fairness opinions lack “meaning” and are devoid
of a “useful function” is because they no longer are being commis-
sioned by directors for the market-driven purpose of obtaining a
thoughtful, sophisticated, unconflicted analysis of a proposed transac-
tion.126  Rather, such opinions are commissioned in order to guard
against the imposition of liability from opportunistic plaintiffs.
In sum, absent the judicial co-option described above, fairness
opinions had to be accurate or else companies would have no incen-
tive to procure such opinions because they are costly.  However, in the
face of judicial co-option, fairness opinions have become less reliable
since the basic motivation for seeking such opinions has changed.  Ab-
122 As one popular investor website observes, “[w]hile they’re not technically required
by law, Fairness Opinions almost always get issued for deals that involve the sale of public
companies due to lawsuits: no matter how much a company sells for, someone is bound to
sue them.”  Brian DeChesare, Investment Banking Fairness Opinions: Profitable and Prestigious,
or Glamorless Gruntwork?, MERGERS & INQUISITIONS, http://www.mergersandinquisitions.
com/investment-banking-fairness-opinions/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2013).
123 Id.
124 Id.; see Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 113, at 29–37 (discussing the preparer’s sub- R
stantial discretion with respect to a fairness opinion); Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman,
Delaware’s Takeover Law: The Uncertain Search for Hidden Value, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 521, 555–57
(2002) (criticizing fairness opinions for their “doubtful” value); William J. Carney, Fairness
Opinions: How Fair Are They and Why We Should Do Nothing About It, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 523,
532–35 (1992) (criticizing fairness opinions for lack of precision and inability to predict
price); Charles M. Elson, Fairness Opinions: Are They Fair or Should We Care?, 53 OHIO ST. L.J.
951, 952–70 (1992) (criticizing fairness opinions for having “dubious” value); Dale Arthur
Oesterle & Jon R. Norberg, Management Buyouts: Creating or Appropriating Shareholder
Wealth?, 41 VAND. L. REV. 207, 214 (1988) (“[T]he chicanery of using made-to-order fair-
ness opinions is probably widespread . . . .”); Michael W. Martin, Note, Fairness Opinions and
Negligent Misrepresentation: Defining Investment Bankers’ Duty to Third-Party Shareholders, 60
FORDHAM L. REV. 133, 140–41 (1991) (“Occasionally, during the mergers-and-acquisitions
boom of the 1980s, the rendering of a fairness opinion became a mere formality per-
formed after a deal was structured . . . .” (footnote omitted)); David Henry, A Fair Deal—
But for Whom?, BUS. WK., Nov. 24, 2003, at 108 (criticizing investment banks rendering
fairness opinions for their lack of objectivity and conflicts of interest). See generally Charles
M. Elson et al., Fairness Opinions: Can They Be Made Useful?, [Aug.–Nov.] Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) No. 35, at 1984 (Nov. 24, 2003) (discussing various criticisms of inves tment bank
fairness opinions).
125 See Davidoff, supra note 19, at 1608–09. R
126 Id.
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sent judicial co-option, the motive for obtaining a fairness opinion is
to obtain valuable information from a reliable expert source.  After
the fairness opinion was co-opted into the law of corporate fiduciary
duties, the purpose of such opinions changed entirely.  In this post-
assimilation environment, the purpose of fairness opinions was and is
still to insulate officers and directors from liability in anticipated deriv-
ative and class action litigation.  This, in turn, transformed and de-
graded the market for fairness opinions.
C. Making Outside Audits Mandatory
Reliable information about the financial condition and financial
performance of companies is obviously of great importance to inves-
tors.  Historically, companies in the capital markets have demanded
the services of independent outside auditors in order to be able to
signal to the market that the financial results being reported by the
company are accurate.127  This need to provide a credible signal of
the integrity and reliability of financial statements is particularly acute
in light of the strong incentives that managers have to misstate earn-
ings and other indicia of financial performance:128
[A]uditors’ reputations are central to the standard economic theory
of auditing.  Only auditors with reputations for honesty and integ-
rity are valuable to audit-clients.  The idea is that, absent a reputa-
tion for honesty and integrity, the auditor’s verification function
loses its value.  In theory, then, auditors invest heavily in creating
and maintaining their reputations for performing honest, high-
quality audits.  High-quality audits by independent auditors who
127 Theodore Eisenberg & Jonathan R. Macey, Was Arthur Anderson Different?  An Empir-
ical Examination of Major Accounting Firm Audits of Large Clients, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.
263, 266 (2004).  Thus, outside auditors do not perform any services for a company that
the company does not already perform for itself.  The role of the auditor is not to prepare
financial reports for clients (that is the role of the accountant).  Rather, the auditor’s role
is to provide a reliable verification of the company’s financial reports. Id.
128 See generally Rick Antle, Auditor Independence, 22 J. ACCT. RES. 1 (1984) (offering two
definitions of auditor independence); George J. Benston, The Value of the SEC’s Accounting
Disclosure Requirements, 44 ACCT. REV. 515 (1969) (examining the value of SEC’s accounting
disclosure requirements for investors); Ronald R. King, Reputation Formation for Reliable Re-
porting: An Experimental Investigation, 71 ACCT. REV. 375 (1996) (exploring reputation for-
mation in a market setting); Ronald R. King, Reputation Formation for Reliable Reporting: An
Experimental Investigation, 71 ACCT. REV. 375 (1996) (exploring reputation formation in a
market setting); Norman Macintosh et al., Accounting as Simulacrum and Hyperreality: Perspec-
tives on Income and Capital, 25 ACCT. ORGS. & SOC’Y 13 (2000) (asserting that accounting no
longer represents reality but instead is a self-referential system); Brian W. Mayhew, Auditor
Reputation Building, 39 J. ACCT. RES. 599 (2001) (modeling auditor reputation building);
Brian W. Mayhew et al., The Effect of Accounting Uncertainty and Auditor Reputation on Auditor
Objectivity, 20 AUDITING J. PRAC. & THEORY 49 (2001) (examining the impact of accounting
uncertainty on auditor objectivity); Ross L. Watts & Jerold L. Zimmerman, Agency Problems,
Auditing, and the Theory of the Firm: Some Evidence, 26 J.L. & ECON. 613 (1983) (detailing the
historical development of the auditing profession).
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have good reputations are assured.  The quality assurance is derived
from the fact that performing poor-quality audits diminishes the
value of the audit firm’s investment in reputation.129
In previous work, Theodore Eisenberg and I have described this
as the “pre-Enron” view of the accounting industry.  This model of the
accounting industry, which was generally embraced by the law and
economics movement,130 predicted that accounting firms would com-
pete in a healthy, reputational “race-to-the-top”:
There was a time when the audit function was carried out in a mar-
ket environment that induced high quality financial reporting.  In
that era, accounting firms were willing to put their seal of approval
on the financial records of a client company only if the company
agreed to conform to the high standards imposed by the accounting
profession.  Investors trusted accountants because investors knew
that any accounting firm that was sloppy or corrupt could not stay in
business for long.  Auditors had significant incentives to do “supe-
rior audit work” because “auditors with strong reputations could
command a fee premium, and high fees ‘signaled’ quality in the
auditing market.”131
Audit firms had incentives to provide high-quality audit services
because they wanted to protect their reputation for independence
and integrity.132  As Professor Eisenberg and I have observed
previously,
[i]n a world in which auditors have both invested in developing
high-quality reputations and in which no single client represents
more than a tiny fraction of total billings, high audit quality seems
assured.  Under these conditions, any potential gain to an auditor
from performing a shoddy audit, much less from participating in a
client’s fraud, would be vastly outweighed by the diminution in
value to the auditor’s reputation.133
Interestingly, even though companies can (and do) audit them-
selves, they can justify the expense of hiring outside auditors to en-
129 Eisenberg & Macey, supra note 127, at 266. R
130 See id.
131 Macey & Sale, supra note 13, at 1168 (quoting Financial Reporting Quality: Implica- R
tions of Accounting, Research: Submission to the (Canadian) S. Standing Comm. on Banking, Trade
and Commerce (2002) (statement of Daniel B. Thorton)).
132 See Eisenberg & Macey, supra note 127, at 266.  Independence is traditionally mea- R
sured by the percentage of an audit firm’s billings that are derived from a particular client.
See Macey & Sale, supra note 13, at 1176.  For example, Andersen was said to be indepen- R
dent of Enron because Andersen had 2300 other audit clients, and Enron accounted for
only about one percent of Andersen’s total revenue from auditing (Andersen’s revenues
from Enron were reportedly $100 million in 2001 as compared to $9.34 billion in total
audit revenues). Id. at 1176 & n.33.  Of course, Andersen’s independence as a firm did not
extend to the partners responsible for doing the actual audit work for Enron. See id. at
1170.
133 Eisenberg & Macey, supra note 127, at 267. R
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hance their financial reputation and credibility with a wide range of
current and prospective claimants on their cash flows—including in-
vestors, suppliers, customers, and prospective employees.  Under this
reputational model, companies need independent audits to attract
outside capital.  The auditors performing these audits would be ex-
pected to quit an engagement before permitting a client to issue inac-
curate or fraudulent financial statements.  Thus, hiring a truly
independent auditor under these conditions allowed companies, even
those that lacked reputations of honesty and probity, to credibly signal
the veracity of their reported financial results.134
The notion was that accounting firms that dismissed an audit cli-
ent would lose only that client.  But this loss probably would be more
than offset as the accounting firm likely would gain new clients by
virtue of the enhancement in the accounting firm’s reputation that
followed from firing the client.  This theory, which I have dubbed the
“law and economics 101” approach to auditing, reflects the view that,
even though companies can and do impose their own financial con-
trols and audit themselves, they hire outside auditors to capitalize on
the audit firm’s reputation for probity. Under this theory, hiring an
auditor allows client companies to “rent” the reputation of the ac-
counting firm, which rents its reputation for care, honesty, and integ-
rity out to its clients.
Unfortunately, this reputational theory of auditors’ services no
longer has much, if any, explanatory power.  In fact, the accounting
industry is no longer characterized by robust competition, and inves-
tors do not trust the numbers vetted by accounting firms.135  Part of
the explanation for this change is that there are no detectable, statisti-
cally significant distinctions among the big accounting firms with re-
spect to quality.136  Rather, the accounting firms all perform about the
same, and there simply is no way for a company to distinguish itself for
134 See Macey & Sale, supra note 13, at 1173.  Being fired by an accounting firm has R
serious implications for the client.  The resignation of an auditor sends a very powerful
negative signal to the capital markets and can have dire consequences not only for the firm
whose auditor resigns but also for the managers of the firm. See, e.g., Martin Fackler, Draw-
ing a Line: Unlikely Team Sets Japanese Banking on Road to Reform, WALL ST. J., Aug. 6, 2003, at
A1 (describing how the auditors’ refusals to sign off on financial projections of a large
Japanese bank caused a crisis that forced the bank to seek a $17 billion government bailout
and put the financial institution under government control).
135 According to a 2002 Gallup poll, “70% of U.S. investors stated that business ac-
counting issues were hurting the investment climate ‘a lot.’”  Paul Atkins, Comm’r, Sec. &
Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at the Federalist Society 20th Annual Convention (Nov. 14,
2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch111402psa.htm.  At the same
time, investors “trust” accountants just as much as they trust corporate executives, lawyers,
and even politicians. Id.
136 See Eisenberg & Macey, supra note 127, at 277. R
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probity and honesty in its accounting standards through its selection
of auditors—contrary to the assumptions of economic theory.137
Many explanations for the decline in audit quality have been of-
fered.138  Relevant to this analysis are the SEC rules that made outside
137 See id. at 290–92.
138 Explanations include: (a) The demise in civil liability and changes in organiza-
tional form resulted in diminished incentives for accounting firms to monitor themselves.
The shift of organizational form from the general partnership form to the limited liability
partnership form reduced the threat of liability faced by audit firm partners not directly
involved in auditing a particular client.  This, in turn, may have resulted in a diminution in
the incentives of accounting firm partners to monitor the performance of their colleagues.
See Macey & Sale, supra note 13, at 1170–71.  The removal of aider-and-abettor liability also R
reduced audit partners’ incentives to monitor one another. See Cent. Bank of Denver v.
First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 176–77 (1994) (holding that Section 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5 prohibit only “the making of a
material misstatement (or omission) or the commission of a manipulative act” and do not
prohibit the aiding and abetting of such acts).  This decision was thought to have substan-
tially alleviated the legal risks to outside advisors such as auditors and lawyers.  This reduc-
tion in incentives was exacerbated in 1995 by passage of the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act (PSLRA).  Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78
(1998)).  The PSLRA established new rules of pleading that require plaintiffs’ complaints
to “state with particularity all facts” that form the basis of the alleged misstatement and give
rise “to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind” when
making a misstatement or omission in financial reporting. Id. § 21D(b)(1)–(2).  The
PSLRA also delayed the beginning of discovery until after a court has decided whether to
allow the case to go forward on the basis of the heightened pleading standards. Id.
§ 21D(b)(3).  Prior to passage of the PSLRA, plaintiffs’ attorneys could begin to gather
documents and interview witnesses as soon as their complaint was filed.  The PSLRA also
sharply limited the doctrine of “joint and several liability,” which insures that victims can
recover full damages even if one or more of the parties to the fraud cannot pay.  Under the
PSLRA, those whose reckless misconduct contributes to the fraud can be held responsible
for only their proportionate share of victims’ losses. See id. § 201(a)(g)(2).  As a result,
when the primary perpetrator of the fraud is bankrupt, investors cannot fully recover their
losses from other entities, such as accounting firms.
(b) Changes in the complexity of financial transactions, which made financial reporting
more difficult, also played a role. See Michael Hill, Crossing the Ethical Divide, THE BALT. SUN
(Feb. 10, 2012), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2002-02-10/topic/0202090331_1_
business-ethics-business-students-complexity (quoting economic historian Louis Galambos,
who did not “think that the increasing complexity of financial transactions, the complexity
of the instruments that can be used in financial transactions, . . . changed the environ-
ment” and led to more opportunities for breaking the law and winding up in prison).
Auditing became more complex as new and more sophisticated methods of financing pro-
liferated and as the audit rules themselves became more technical and complex. Cf. Struc-
tured Finance, SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, http://www.sullcrom.com/practices/detail.
aspx?service=71 (last visited Jan. 20, 2013) (discussing the “the increased sophistication
and complexity of many securitization transaction”).  As a consequence, audit firms en-
gaged by large public companies found that the “audit engagement teams” they assigned
to perform audits had to spend increasingly large percentages of their time performing
audit services for that client.
(c) The provision of consulting services by accounting firms upset the traditional balance
of power between issuers and auditors and contributed to the capture of accounting firms
by their clients.  When accounting firms also provide consulting services, they might be
tempted to use auditing work either as a loss leader or “as a mechanism for ‘opening the
door’ with a client for the purpose of pitching their (higher margin) consulting services.”
Macey & Sale, supra note 13, at 1178.  Providing consulting services further erodes auditor R
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audits compulsory for firms139 and required that such audits be car-
ried out by auditors deemed by the SEC to be independent of man-
agement.140  The SEC’s regulations have effectively cartelized the
accounting industry by requiring that large, publicly held corpora-
tions be audited by accounting firms that obtain only a small propor-
tion of their revenues from any one client.  This, in turn, means that
large public companies can only be audited by very large accounting
firms.  This has led to the massive consolidation that the accounting
industry has experienced in recent decades.141
The SEC’s long-standing notion about what constitutes “auditor
independence” has contributed significantly to the decline in the
quality of the auditor-client relationship.  Enron provides a useful ex-
ample of the problem.
For regulatory purposes, Arthur Andersen was said to be inde-
pendent of Enron because Enron accounted for less than one percent
of Arthur Andersen’s billings, but Enron appears to have accounted
for all of the billings of the lead partner assigned to the Enron audit
and for several members of his team.  Worse, Arthur Andersen man-
agement in Chicago appears to have relied exclusively on its captured
audit team not only for its information about the client, but also for
how to report the financial information provided by the client.  Un-
fortunately, although Andersen undoubtedly represented an extreme
independence by shifting the balance of power away from the auditor and in the direction
of the audit client when auditors are discussing audit work and retention issues.  Worse,
consulting services provide a means by which audit clients can reward auditors for suc-
cumbing to the client’s wishes about what accounting treatment should be used to report
novel or complex transactions and business practices. Id.  When auditors only offer clients
audit services, the client’s only option is to fire the auditor if the client does not think that
the auditor is being sufficiently aggressive or compliant.  But when the accountants also are
peddling consulting services, the client can employ a “carrot and stick” strategy that re-
wards the accounting firm for being compliant and punishes the firm for being inflexible.
This pressure is particularly acute in an environment in which the firm is the only client of
the engagement partner from the accounting firm that is performing the audit, since a
partner’s inability to procure lucrative consulting work would be reflected in salary, promo-
tion, and bonuses.  As John Coffee has observed, it is difficult for an audit client to fire its
auditor because such dismissals invite “potential public embarrassment, public disclosure
of the reasons for the auditor’s dismissal or resignation, and potential SEC intervention.”
John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: “It’s About the Gatekeepers, Stupid,” 57 BUS. L. 1403,
1411–12 (2002) (footnote omitted).  But when a company is both an audit client as well as
a consulting client of the accounting firm, “the client can then easily terminate the auditor
as a consultant, or reduce its use of the firm’s consulting services, in retaliation for the
auditor’s intransigence.”  Macey & Sale, supra note 13, at 1179 (quoting Coffee, supra, at R
1412).  When the audit client terminates the high margin consulting services and retains
only the low margin auditing services, there is no need to make any public disclosure.  This
means that there is no risk that firing the auditor from a consulting engagement will pro-
voke heightened scrutiny from investors, the SEC, or plaintiffs’ class action law firms.
139 See Macey & Sale, supra note 13, at 1173 (outlining independent audit require- R
ments under the federal securities laws).
140 Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210.1-02 (2012) (defining auditor independence).
141 See Macey & Sale, supra note 13, at 1176–77. R
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example of an auditing firm losing its internal controls, the general
contours of the auditor-client relationship that [characterized] Ander-
sen and Enron are common.142  The nature of this relationship sug-
gests that investors have good reason to worry about the quality of the
financial reporting provided by the national accounting firms, even
when the SEC considers such firms to be “independent.”
Thus, the role of accounting firms in capital markets and corpo-
rate governance is eerily similar to the role of credit rating agencies.
What began as a subtle, reputation-based, highly efficient relationship
has evolved into a relationship driven by regulatory requirements
rather than genuine, market-driven demand.  Specifically, where com-
panies used to hire auditors to provide an independent, credible ver-
ification of their reported financial results, companies now hire them
out of regulatory necessity.  In both cases, rules emerged that trans-
formed the once-voluntary relationship between companies and ac-
countants into a compulsory relationship.  Once the core purpose of
the engagement with auditors became regulatory compliance rather
than the assurance of financial reporting accuracy, the nature of the
relationship changed.  This shift, coupled with the auditor indepen-
dence rule, which cartelized the accounting industry, and coupled
with the removal of personal liability for accounting errors, had the
cumulative effect, as Professor Eisenberg and I previously have ob-
served,143 of eliminating any quality distinctions that might once have
existed among the major accounting firms that audit large public
companies.  Absent the ability to make such quality distinctions
among auditors, issuers must select auditors on the basis of other cri-
teria, such as cost and malleability.
D. Making Internal Risk Modeling Mandatory
No private sector innovation has captured the regulatory imagi-
nation more than the use of internal risk assessments by financial in-
stitutions.  In the late 1980s, following the stock market crash of 1987,
financial institutions—particularly the largest and most sophisticated
and complex banking and financial services firms—began to utilize
state-of-the-art financial mathematics to measure and control their
firms’ financial risk.144  The methodology for doing this involves the
utilization of a Value-at-Risk (VaR) model or similar algorithm, which
142 Id. at 1169–70; see Jonathan R. Macey, Efficient Capital Markets, Corporate Disclosure,
and Enron, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 394, 409–10 (2004); accord Coffee, supra note 138, at R
1415–16 (“Auditing firms have always known that an individual partner could be domi-
nated by a large client and might defer excessively to such a client in a manner that could
inflict liability on the firm.”).
143 Eisenberg & Macey, supra note 127, at 297–99. R
144 See PHILIPPE JORION, VALUE AT RISK: THE NEW BENCHMARK FOR MANAGING FINANCIAL
RISK 21–22 (2d ed. 2001).
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measures the maximum loss that a financial company might experi-
ence under various sets of assumptions.145
VaR models generate risk measures on the specific portfolios of
financial assets that financial institutions hold or may be considering.
Starting with a particular portfolio, and using various measures of
probability and time horizons, a portfolio’s VaR is the measure of the
probability that the actual (marked-to-market rather than accounting)
loss on the measured portfolio during the given time horizon will ex-
ceed a particular threshold value.146  Thus, for example, assigning to a
particular portfolio of stocks a one-day 98.5% VaR of $100 million
means that the financial institution assigning this VaR believes that
there is a 1.5% chance that the portfolio will fall in value by more than
$100 million over a one-day period.
Following the financial crisis of 1987, VaR models became widely
used in measuring risk, in implementing financial controls, and in de-
termining appropriate levels of capital.  Stress testing is used as part of
VaR calculations to measure the stability of a particular institution’s
balance sheet.147  Stress testing involves measuring the ability of a fi-
nancial institution to withstand pressures in excess of normal opera-
tional levels in order to ascertain the point at which the entity will
fail.148  Variations on the VaR modeling process such as “tail value at
risk” (TVaR, also known as tail conditional expectation) permit firms
to measure the severity of possible failures as well as the probability
that failure will occur.149
Regulators quickly incorporated VaR models into various regula-
tory frameworks for financial institutions.  Beginning in 1997, the SEC
pushed investment banks to provide VaR information in the notes to
their financial statements in its ruling requiring U.S. public corpora-
tions to “disclose quantitative information about the risk” of their de-
rivatives activity.150  Major banks and dealers implemented the rule by
presenting VaR models in their financial statements.151
Even more significantly, the Basel II capital guidelines, which
would, if adopted, dictate the capital requirements for virtually every
bank in the world, have adopted VaR throughout the regulations.
VaR is the preferred measure of market risk.  Significantly, the Basel
145 See id.
146 See id. at 24–25.
147 See Tanya Styblo Beder, VAR: Seductive but Dangerous, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Sept.–Oct.
1995, at 12, 23 (discussing how VaR models should be supplemented with stress testing and
other checks).
148 See 12 U.S.C. § 5365(i) (2006).
149 For a comprehensive explanation of VaR, see generally JORION, supra note 144; R
Darrell Duffie & Jun Pan, An Overview of Value-at-Risk, 4 J. DERIVATIVES 7 (1997).
150 See JORION, supra note 144, at 47–48. R
151 Id.
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capital guidelines permit VaR and other so-called “internal ratings-
based” approaches to evaluate credit risk, thus permitting banks to
rely on their own measures of a counterparty’s risk.152  These guide-
lines also envision that banks can effectively determine their own reg-
ulatory capital requirements first by creating, and then adjusting, their
own internal models.153  Under the version of the Basel II capital
guidelines adopted in the United States by various federal regulators,
including the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board), the Fed-
eral Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and the (now abolished)
Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), a risk-based capital adequacy
framework requires certain banks, bank holding companies, and sav-
ings and loan associations (S&Ls) to “use an internal ratings-based
approach to calculate regulatory credit risk capital requirements and
advanced measurement approaches to calculate regulatory opera-
tional risk capital requirements.”154
Interestingly, regulators fully understand that the use of financial
institutions’ own internal risk assessment tools will occur in an envi-
ronment in which banks’ models are constantly evolving.155  Unfortu-
nately, the regulators do not seem to have grasped the notion, central
to the analysis in this Article, that banks’ incentives regarding how to
utilize a market process such as an internal risk assessment tool
change when that process becomes incorporated into regulation.156
Internal risk assessment tools are particularly subject to distortion
by regulatory co-option.157  Absent any regulatory overlay, internal risk
assessment tools are useful for banks to see what sorts of potential
problems they are facing.  As soon as internal risk assessment tools
become internalized into regulation, the consequences of using these
tools change dramatically.  Regulators and banks, after all, want to use
internal risk assessments in order to calculate the amount of capital
that banks must maintain to offset particular assets.  Because capital is
152 See French et al., supra note 4; see also Risk-Based Capital Standards: Advanced Capi- R
tal Adequacy Framework—Basel II, 72 Fed. Reg. 69,288, 69,289, 69,291–92, 69,338 (Dec. 7,
2007) (adopting the “internal ratings-based” approach to credit risk based on results of the
Basel II Accord).
153 See id. at 69,294; see also supra notes 3–4 and accompanying text. R
154 Risk-Based Capital Standards: Advanced Capital Adequacy Framework—Basel II, 72
Fed. Reg. at 69,288.
155 Id. at 69,291 (“Because bank risk management practices are both continually evolv-
ing and subject to uncertainty, the framework should be viewed as an effort to improve the
risk sensitivity of the risk-based capital requirements for banks, rather than as an effort to
produce a statistically precise measurement of risk.”).
156 PARTNOY, supra note 13, at 262–63. R
157 See Beder, supra note 147, at 12 (showing how VaR calculations are “extremely de- R
pendent on parameters, data, assumptions, and methodology”—i.e., different methods of
calculating VaRs can yield significantly different results—and observing that VaR calcula-
tions “are not sufficient to control risk”).
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very expensive for firms relative to debt,158 once internal risk assess-
ments become incorporated into regulation, the use of such assess-
ments can significantly impact the costs of financial institutions.
Banks understand that once internal risk assessments can be used to
justify reserve capital requirements, they will have incentives to adjust
their models, and to modify the way that their models are used, in
order to mitigate the costs of using these models.
Besides the odd fact that regulators do not seem to realize that
their regulations might actually have an influence on the develop-
ment of banks’ internal risk assessment tools, a second striking thing
about the incorporation of banks’ internal risk assessment processes
into the capital adequacy rules is the amount of trust that the regula-
tors apparently have in the banks.
The regulators understand that “a system is only as good as the
inputs that go into it.”159  They also assume that financial institutions
permitted to use their own internal risk assessments to measure risk
will be able “to measure the key statistical drivers of credit risk.”160
Strangely, though, there does not appear to be any theoretical or sta-
tistical basis for assuming that banks can do this, particularly in the
absence of independent oversight.161  Moreover, there is no generally
accepted paradigm or protocol for determining which of the myriad
technical approaches to internal risk assessment represents best prac-
tices or even acceptable industry standards.  Whatever banks come up
with themselves appears to be fine with the regulators.  As one regula-
tor observed, “the Basel Committee clearly recognizes that there is
more than one way to [measure credit risk].”162  As such, the applica-
ble capital rules should “provide banks with the flexibility to rely on
data derived from experience, or from external sources, as long as the
bank can demonstrate the relevance of the external data to its own
exposures.”163
158 See supra note 54. R
159 Rutledge, supra note 3. R
160 Id.
161 See Rachel Wolcott, Beyond the Numbers: Do Banks Manage Risk?, REUTERS (June 14,
2012), http://blogs.reuters.com/financial-regulatory-forum/2012/06/14/beyond-the-
numbers-do-banks-manage-risk/ (observing that “[i]t is a myth that banks are in possession
of fancy gadgetry that allows them to measure risk on a minute-by-minute basis from a
specialised risk-control tower and react to it effectively, thus  averting catastrophe”); see also
Istva´n Magas, Financial Innovation: Regulator’s Nightmare, 2 INT’L REL. Q. 1, 2 (2011), availa-
ble at http://www.southeast-europe.org/pdf/07/DKE_07_A_V_Magas-Istvan.pdf (“When
the bulk of a company’s assets were physical and its markets were relatively stable, valuation
was more straightforward.  Now growing proportions of a firm’s assets—brands, ideas,
human capital—are intangible and often hard to identify, let alone value. . . .  This new,
very innovative partly IT-related, complex market development has increased the difficul-
ties of assessing risk and value, especially in a global context.”).
162 Rutledge, supra note 3.
163 Id.
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Investors have a strong incentive in accurately measuring the risks
of the banks in which they invest.  And properly motivated and incen-
tivized bankers have an incentive to measure risk accurately in order
to improve loan performance by avoiding lemons and identifying
cherries in loan applications and other investments.  On the other
hand, the necessity of disclosing such risk measurements to powerful
and potentially intrusive regulators distorts this incentive and may
provide incentives for banks to understate the levels of risk faced.
The well-publicized billion-dollar loss suffered in early 2012 by
JPMorgan provides an illuminating example of the potential results of
a financial institution deriving its own VaR model that qualifies as suf-
ficient for regulatory purposes.164  CEO Jamie Dimon acknowledged,
while announcing JPMorgan’s losses, that the bank had altered its VaR
model for its Chief Investment Office so that potential losses calcu-
lated by the VaR were approximately halved, from $129 million to $67
million.  The reasons for this change in the VaR model “appear cer-
tain to be at the center of regulatory and shareholder inquiries into
the losses.”165  Yet, JPMorgan may not have disobeyed existing regula-
tions.  The SEC requires that financial institutions disclose changes in
their risk models.166  However, the institutions do not need to disclose
164 The losses, originally announced on May 10, 2012, stemmed from JPMorgan’s
Chief Investment Office (CIO).  The media initially reported in April 2012 on a trader in
London named Bruno Iksil, known to many as the “London Whale.”  Stephanie Ruhle et
al., JPMorgan Trader’s Positions Said to Distort Credit Indexes, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 6, 2012, 10:43
AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-04-05/jpmorgan-trader-iksil-s-heft-is-said-to-
distort-credit-indexes.html (discussing Bruno Iksil, the trader involved in the credit-deriva-
tive indexes).  Iksil, who specialized in credit-derivative indexes, and the CIO built up an
extremely complicated, high-stakes bet over a period of years.  According to the New York
Times, “[i]n its simplest form, . . . the complex position assembled by the bank included a
bullish bet on an index of investment-grade corporate debt, later paired with a bearish bet
in high-yield securities, achieved by selling insurance contracts known as credit-default
swaps.”  Nelson D. Schwartz & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, JPMorgan’s Trading Loss Is Said to
Rise at Least 50%, DEALB%K (May 16, 2012, 9:14 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2012/05/16/jpmorgans-trading-loss-is-said-to-rise-at-least-50/.  A “big move” in the interest
rate spread between risk-free government bonds and investment grade securities, paired
with a lack of “equally large moves in the price of the insurance on the high yield bonds,”
caused the bet to lead to huge losses. Id.  Total losses could eventually total $9 billion. See
Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Susanne Craig, JPMorgan Trading Loss May Reach $9 Billion,
DEALB%K (June 28, 2012, 2:30 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/05/16/
jpmorgans-trading-loss-is-said-to-rise-at-least-50/; see also Maureen Farrell, JPMorgan’s Losses
Keep Adding Up, CNNMONEY (June 12, 2012, 11:24 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/06/
12/investing/jpmorgan-loss/index.htm; Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Peter Eavis, JPMorgan
Discloses $2 Billion in Trading Losses, DEALB%K (May 10, 2012, 10:11 PM), http://dealbook.
nytimes.com/2012/05/10/jpmorgan-discloses-significant-losses-in-trading-group/ (discuss-
ing JPMorgan’s failed hedging strategy and its potential effect on regulatory reforms).
165 David Henry, Analysis: JPMorgan to Be Haunted by Change in Risk Model, REUTERS
(May 18, 2012, 5:13 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/18/us-jpmorgan-risk-
idUSBRE84H15120120518.
166 SEC Regulation S-K requires disclosure “[i]f registrants change disclosure alterna-
tives or key model characteristics, assumptions, and parameters used in providing quantita-
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this information until the end of the fiscal year.167  JPMorgan’s initial
first quarter report on April 13 revealed the $67 million risk but did
not note that the VaR had changed.168  Dimon attributed the change
in models to the natural experimental process: “There are constant
changes and updates to models—always trying to get them better than
they were before. . . . That is an ongoing procedure.”169  Many have
expressed doubt regarding Dimon’s statements, noting that, while
banks do alter their VaR models, rarely do the changes produce such
different results.170
The JPMorgan case has resulted in congressional investigations of
the bank’s losses and its regulators.171  Furthermore, the already tenu-
ous credibility of VaR models has come under further scrutiny.  The
losses show the downside of co-opting the VaRs for regulatory pur-
poses.  Ironically, JPMorgan led the development of VaR models in
the early 1990s.172  The financial crisis, however, showed that many of
the VaR models used faulty historical data and assumptions.173  The
requirement to disclose changes to VaR models solely at the end of
the fiscal year seemingly created this loophole through which JPMor-
gan was able to change its VaR model for the CIO, but not in other
offices, and accomplish its highly risky actions.174  The Basel Commit-
tee, as noted above, acknowledged multiple ways to measure risk and
wished to “provide banks with the flexibility to rely on data derived
tive information about market risk . . . and if the effects of any such change is material.”  17
C.F.R. § 229.305(a)(4) (2012).
167 “Registrants shall provide, in their reporting currency, quantitative information
about market risk as of the end of the latest fiscal year . . . .” Id. § 229.305(a)(1).
168 Henry, supra note 165. R
169 Id.
170 Id. (“Banks sometimes refine their value-at-risk, or VaR, models but those common-
place changes do not by themselves produce such dramatically different results, said Chris-
topher Finger, one of the founders of RiskMetrics Group, which pioneered VaR models
and is now a unit of MSCI Inc.”).
171 See Scott Patterson, Comptroller Sees Risk-Management Breakdown at J.P. Morgan, WALL
ST. J. (June 5, 2012, 5:15 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405270230383020
4577448773700425452.html (“The OCC has been taking heat from members of Congress
for failing to pick up on J.P. Morgan’s trading activities quickly enough.”); Ben Protess,
Regulator Concedes Oversight Lapse in JPMorgan Loss, DEALB%K (June 6, 2012, 8:51 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/06/06/battle-lines-over-volcker-rule-are-revisited-at-
jpmorgan-hearing/ (discussing the Senate Banking Committee hearing regarding JPMor-
gan’s loss, where the Comptroller of the Currency “faced the brunt of the scrutiny,” and
noting previous hearings where officials from JPMorgan’s other regulators, the CFTC and
SEC, testified).
172 Tracy Alloway, JPMorgan Loss Stokes Risk Model Fears, FIN. TIMES (May 13, 2012, 6:29
PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/1293de8c-9ba2-11e1-b03e-00144feabdc0.html#ax
zz26XuEpH5x.
173 Id.; see Henry, supra note 165. R
174 The VaR was only changed for the CIO; the other divisions of the bank continued
to use more “conservative” models.  Henry, supra note 165. R
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from experience.”175  By making VaRs part of the financial regulatory
apparatus but allowing banks to continue to alter the models and only
disclose these changes at set intervals, financial regulators appear to
have created the conditions under which JPMorgan seemingly was
able to alter its own VaR models to lessen the apparent risk in what
was actually an extremely risky series of actions.
In other words, banks are now permitted to design the very exam-
inations that will be used to evaluate their financial condition.  Re-
marks on risk-based capital by William Rutledge, Executive Vice
President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, illustrate the ex-
tent to which the capital guidelines relied on undeveloped and unt-
ested models that depended on data that was not yet even available at
the time:
Given our desire for Basel II to be consistent with the best ex-
isting and emerging risk measurement and management practices,
getting specific feedback from the industry is particularly
critical. . . .
Time and effort has also been invested in developing richer
and more meaningful data on past, and likely future, credit per-
formance—data that are needed to fuel management information
and control systems for senior management use.  I expect that
much of the cost to banks of adopting the advanced approaches of
Basel II will come from pushing ahead on precisely these types of
initiatives.
The Basel standards outline the data history [that] banks will
need in order to use the IRB (Internal Risk Based) approach.  The
[Basel] Committee recognizes that banks may not currently have all
of the required information on hand. For this reason we have con-
tinued to engage market participants in a dialogue on this issue.176
As the credit crisis approached, regulators, under the so-called “mar-
ket risk amendment”  to the original Basel Accord,177 increasingly
were allowing the world’s largest financial institutions, primarily those
with large market risk positions, to use their own internal estimates of
the risks associated with their activities in determining what their own
capital requirements would be for regulatory purposes.
Thus, financial institutions subject to minimum capital require-
ments were not merely allowed to determine for themselves whether
they were in compliance with such requirements; they also were al-
lowed to design for themselves the test that they would use for making
this determination.  As Professor Partnoy observed, financial institu-
175 Rutledge, supra note 3. R
176 Id.
177 Id.; BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, OVERVIEW OF THE AMENDMENT TO
THE CAPITAL ACCORD TO INCORPORATE MARKET RISKS 2 (1996), available at http://
www.bis.org/publ/bcbs23.pdf.
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tions used faulty VaR models due to legal rules.  Regulators required
firms to use and to disclose their VaR measures but, in doing so, they
were “inadvertently encouraging firms to misstate their own risks.”178
Professor Partnoy suggests that there was a problem with VaR
models themselves, calling them “faulty” on the grounds that “all
these models really did was compare historical measures of risk and
return.”179  This observation, while true, is describing the first genera-
tion of VaR models developed in the mid- to late-1990s.  The models,
such as the ones used by failed firms including Bankers Trust and
Long Term Capital Management, were what regulators ultimately as-
similated into their own regulations.180  Once these models were
adopted by regulators, however, they became ossified.  If these models
had not been incorporated into regulation, the companies using them
would have had strong incentives to refine and improve them in order
to make them more accurate and useful as internal evaluation
mechanisms.
Regulatory assimilation distorted the incentives of the firms who
developed VaR models.  The process of assimilation subverted the in-
tegrity of the very algorithms being co-opted.  Unfortunately, like
credit ratings, internal risk models, which were once a promising
means for banks to improve their internal controls, have become
largely discredited.  For example, Sheila Bair, the former chairman of
the FDIC, observed that “in the years preceding the financial crisis,
under the advanced approaches of Basel II, regulators allowed the
largest banks to use their own internal models to set individual risk-
based capital requirements.”181  Regulators permitted this on the pre-
mise that “the largest banks didn’t need as much capital as smaller
banks due to their sophisticated internal risk models and diversifica-
tion.”182  According to Ms. Bair, “[t]he crisis demonstrated the fallacy
of this thinking.”183
CONCLUSION
In this paper, the term regulation by assimilation is used to de-
scribe the process by which internal norms, rules, or practices of pri-
vate firms are assimilated into regulation.  The descriptive purpose of
this Article has been to point out the large role played by regulatory
178 PARTNOY, supra note 13, at 262. R
179 Id.
180 Id. at 261–62
181 Sarah Borchersen-Keto, FDIC Moves on Dodd-Frank Capital Requirements, WOLTERS
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assimilation in the regulation of the financial markets.  The normative
purpose has been to show that the very process of assimilation tends
to undermine the efficacy of the very mechanisms and institutions be-
ing co-opted.
In recent decades, regulators have come to recognize the differ-
ence between mandatory and enabling rules and, in some cases, par-
ticularly in the corporate context, they have begun to consider with
care the costs and benefits of making a particular legal rule
mandatory or enabling.184  At the same time, another far less heralded
but similarly important revolution in regulatory approach to financial
markets was taking place.  This second, much quieter regulatory sea
change consisted of the forced assimilation of market-based mecha-
nisms and institutions into regulation.  This paper has examined four
such assimilations.  These insidious assimilations of credit ratings, fair-
ness opinions, internal audits, and internal risk assessments into vari-
ous regulations have had a corrupting influence on these mechanisms
and institutions.  Each of the market-generated devices has become
less useful after being conscripted for use by regulators.
The diminution in the value of each of these market mechanisms
was an entirely unforeseen consequence of their co-option by regula-
tors.  In fact, and rather ironically, the regulators effectuating this as-
similation thought that they were harnessing the efficiency of the
market in the service of more effective and enlightened regulation.
But the takeaway point of this Article is not necessarily that regu-
lators should avoid co-opting market mechanisms into regulations.
Such a conclusion would be premature because it has yet to be consid-
ered whether a more enlightened regulatory approach might work
better.  Such a regulatory approach will only begin when regulators
recognize the fact that their efforts to co-opt market institutions into
various regulatory frameworks risk distorting the very market
processes that they wish to internalize into regulation.  Though far
from certain, it is at least conceivable that more carefully designed
regulations that are sensitive to the risks of distorting the very market
mechanisms being assimilated might avoid the problems identified in
this Article.
184 Cf. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on
the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618, 1618–19 (1989) (discussing the “partly enabling,
partly mandatory” character of corporate law); Jonathan R. Macey, Corporate Law and Corpo-
rate Governance: A Contractual Perspective, 18 J. CORP. L. 185, 211, passim (1993) (detailing
the arguments for mandatory or enabling rules and arguing that “investors, capital mar-
kets, and society generally will be better off if policymakers take an enabling approach to
corporate law”).
